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I. INTRODUCTION
The election of Donald J. Trump as President of the United States in
November of 2016 generally surprised most observers. According to
reports, his victory surprised even the candidate himself.2 While the
flawed polling data caused some of the widespread surprise, much of the
consternation concerned the unconventional nature of the candidate and
his campaign. Not only did many of Trump's policy positions conflict
with the traditional positions of his party,' but his authoritarian style
I See, e.g., Matt Flegenheimer & Michael Barbaro, Donald Trump is Elected President
in Stunning Repudiation of the Establishment, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/us/politics/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-president.html;
Shane Goldmacher & Ben Schreckinger, Trump Pulls off Biggest Upset in U.S. History,
POLITICO (Nov. 9, 2016, 3:58 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/election-results-
2016-clinton-trump-231070; David A. Graham, Donald Trump's Stunning Upset, THE
ATLANTIC (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/donald-
trump-elected-president/507062/; Jim Norman, Trump Victory Surprises Americans; Four in
10 Afraid, GALLUP (Nov. 11, 2016), https://news.gallup.comL/poll/197375/trump-victory-
surprises-americans-four-afraid.aspx.
2 See Kelly O'Donnell, Uncertain Trump Team Prepared 2 Speeches on Election
Night: Sources, NBC NEWS (Nov. 9, 2016, 1:52 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/2016-election-day/uncertain-trump-team-prepared-2-
speeches-election-night-sources-n681511; Shannon Vavra, Report: Trump Didn't Have a
Victory Speech Prepared on Election Night, AXioS (July 17, 2017),
https://www.axios.com/report-trump-didnt-have-a-victory-speech-prepared-on-election-night-
1513304256-OdalaOa2-9083-4fad-bb3f-c3e7929b2054.html.
3 See Carl Bialik & Harry Enten, The Polls Missed Trump. We Asked Pollsters Why.,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 9, 2016, 4:53 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-polls-
missed-trump-we-asked-pollsters-why/; Kenneth P. Vogel & Alex Isenstadt, How Did
Everyone Get it so Wrong?, POLITICO (Nov. 9, 2016, 12:15 AM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/how-did-everyone-get-2016-wrong-presidential-
election-231036.
4 See Noah Bierman, Here are the Places Where Donald Trump and the Republican
Party Disagree, L.A. TIMES (July 20, 2016), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-
gop-positions-20160720-snap-htmlstory.html (noting that some areas of disagreement between
President Trump and the GOP include trade, immigration, social security, foreign policy, and
the size of government); Philip Bump, Donald Trump is not a Traditional Republican-
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differed sharply from previously conceived standards of presidential
behavior.'
In addition to contributing to the shocking nature of his electoral
victory, Trump's authoritarian style and worldview may indeed have
contributed to the victory itself, as he appears to have been able to tap into
a strong authoritarian current beneath the surface of American society. As
early as the primaries, commentators asserted that Trump's authoritarian
worldview was a primary motivator for his supporters.6 As Trump
proceeded to win the Republican nomination and the presidency, it
became clear that rather than causing a dramatic shift into
authoritarianism, Trump recognized the pre-existence of a strong
authoritarian theme in American culture and knew how to harness it.'
Regardless of the extent that Trump's candidacy benefited from a
latent strain of authoritarianism in American culture, Trump's presidency
subsequently sparked a resurgence of antiauthoritarianism. Both President
Trump's authoritarian approach to his office and the antiauthoritarian
Including on Some Big Issues, WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/08/30/where-donald-trump-differs-
with-republican-party-orthodoxy/?noredirect-on&utmterm=.e2fc0164c828 (discussing
differences between President Trump and the GOP, including his view on single-payer health
care, immigration, and taxes); Greg Krieg et al., Trump vs. the GOP on the Issues, CNN (June
9, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2016/06/politics/trump-vs-gop-platform-issues/.
I See Steve Denning, Trump and Authoritarian Propaganda, FORBES (Nov. 6, 2016,
8:52 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2016/11/06/trump-and-authoritarian-
propaganda/#16c89693e0a; see also Brett Edkins, Donald Trump's Authoritarian Speech
Confounds the Media, FORBES (July 22, 2016, 12:16 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/brettedkins/2016/07/22/media-confounded-by-donald-trumps-
authoritarian-speech/#7670964b67dd.
6 Matthew MacWilliams, The One Weird Trait that Predicts Whether You're a Trump
Supporter, POLITICO (Jan. 17, 2016),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/01/donald-trump-2016-authoritarian-213533
("Trump's electoral strength-and his staying power-have been buoyed, above all, by
Americans with authoritarian inclinations. And because of the prevalence of authoritarians in
the American electorate, among Democrats as well as Republicans, it's very possible that
Trump's fan base will continue to grow."); Amanda Taub, The Rise of American
Authoritarianism, Vox (Mar. 1, 2016, 9:00 AM),
https://www.vox.com/2016/3/1/11127424/trump-authoritarianism("Muchofthepolarization
dividing American politics was fueled not just by gerrymandering or money in politics or the
other oft-cited variables, but by an unnoticed but surprisingly large electoral group-
authoritarians.").
See MATTHEW C. MACWILLIAMS, THE RISE OF TRUMP: AMERICA'S
AUTHORITARIAN SPRING 31-32 (2016); David Frum, How Donald Trump Could Build an
Autocracy in the U.S., THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/03/how-to-build-an-autocracy/513872/;
see also Christopher R. Browning, The Suffocation ofDemocracy, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS (Oct.
25, 2018), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2018/10/25/suffocation-of-democracy/.
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reaction to the same became apparent immediately after his inauguration.8
Following the inauguration, the National Park Service retweeted
information regarding the relatively small size of the crowd for Trump's
inauguration compared to that of his predecessor.' President Trump
responded by ordering all federal government offices to suspend tweeting
until further notice.o While most official social media accounts of the
National Park Service complied with the gag order, rogue tweeting
emerged first from the Badlands and then from unofficial social media
accounts." This began the Alt National Park Service, a movement started
by National Park Service employees and other environmentalist actors
explicitly to resist policies of the Trump Administration.12 It also led to
the subsequent widespread internet meme about park rangers leading the
resistance.13
Another incident from early in the Trump presidency that
demonstrated the existence of a strong antiauthoritarian element in
American culture took the form of the response to the "Muslim ban"- an
executive order banning foreign nationals from seven heavily Muslim
nations and refugees from visiting the United States for a set period of
time. 4 The executive order prompted numerous activities. There were
airport protests across the nation," as well as small lawyer armies
8 See Binyamin Appelbaum (@BCAppelbaum), TWITTER (Jan. 20, 2017, 1:04 PM),
https://twitter.com/BCAppelbaum/status/822550063658532865.
9 Id.
10 William Turton, National Park Service Bannedfrom Tweeting after Anti-Trump
Retweets, GIZMODO (Jan. 20, 2017, 8:04 PM), https://gizmodo.com/national-park-service-
banned-from-tweeting-after-anti-t-1791449526.
1 Wynne Davis, Rogue National Park Accounts Emerge on Twitter Amid Social Media
Gag Orders, NPR (Jan. 25, 2017, 4:40 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2017/01/25/511664825/rogue-national-park-
accounts-emerge-on-twitter-amid-social-media-gag-orders.
12 See About, ALT NAT'L PARK SERV., https://altnps.org/about (last visited Nov. 15,
2019).
13 See MEME, https://me.me/i/first-they-came-for-the-scientists-and-the-national-parks-
8183351 (last visited Feb. 18, 2020) ("First they came for the scientists ... And the National
Parks Services said, 'lol, no' and went rogue and we were all like, 'I was not expecting the park
rangers to lead the resistance, none of the dystopian novels I read prepared me for this but
cool.").
14 Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977, 8978-79 (Jan. 27, 2017).
15 James Doubek, Thousands Protest at Airports Nationwide Against Trump's
Immigration Order, NPR (Jan. 29, 2017, 5:30 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2017/01/29/512250469/photos-thousands-protest-at-airports-nationwide-against-trumps-
immigration-order.
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swarming airports to provide pro bono assistance to travelers.16 in
addition, there was a taxi cab boycott of JFK Airport" and an Uber
boycott." Furthermore, there was a dramatic increase in donations to the
ACLU and other activist groups.1 9 And, of course, there was another
ubiquitous internet meme.2 0
While chronicling all the antiauthoritarian protests and actions that
occurred in response to various actions of the Trump Administration
would be well beyond the scope of this article, an examination of hashtag
usage shows both the broad appeal and persistence of antiauthoritarianism
in response to perceived authoritarianism from the White House. In a
recent study, the Pew Research Center found that #Resist had been used
on Twitter an average of nearly sixty-thousand times per day during the
time period from Trump's inauguration through May 1, 2018.21 Other
hashtags, such as #BlackLivesMatter and #MeToo, which one can also
view as antiauthoritarian within their contexts, were used even more
within the same time period.22 The hashtag usage combined with the
prevalence of the park ranger resistance and anti-Muslim ban memes
discussed above, both of which derive from a famous poem lamenting the
failure of German intellectuals to challenge the authority of the Nazi Party
1 See Jonah Engel Bromwich, Lawyers Mobilize at Nation's Airports After Trump's
Order, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/us/lawyers-trump-
muslim-ban-immigration.html; see also Dahlia Lithwick, The Lawyers Showed Up, SLATE (Jan.
28, 2017, 10:58 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/01/lawyers-take-on-donald-
trumps-muslim-ban.html.
17 Mary Papenfuss, Striking New York Cabbies Join Airport Protest Against Trump's
Muslim Crackdown, HUFFPOST (Jan. 28, 2017, 8:49 PM),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/new-york-cabbies-strike-muslim-
bann _588d2cd0e4b0b065cbbc6512.
18 See Lucinda Shen, 200,000 Users Have Left Uber in the #DeleteUber Protest,
FORTUNE (Feb. 3, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/02/03/uber-lyft-delete-donald-trump-
executive-order/. The problems began when Uber turned off the surge pricing for trips to New
York's JFK Airport during the protests of the immigration ban, which activists interpreted was
a sign of support for the Executive Order that banned immigration from seven Muslim-majority
nations. Id.
9 Liam Stack, Donations to A.C.L.U and Other Organizations Surge After Trump's
Order, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/us/aclu-fund-
raising-trump-travel-ban.html.
20 MEME, https://me.me/i/first-they-came-for-the-muslims-and-we-said-not-8524873
(last visited Nov. 15, 2019) ("First they came for the Muslims ... AND WE SAID NOT THIS
TIME MOTHERF***ERS").
21 MONICA ANDERSON ET AL., AN ANALYSIS OF #BLACKLIVESMATrER AND OTHER
TWITTER HASHTAGS RELATED TO POLITICAL OR SOCIAL ISSUES, PEW RES. CTR. (July 11,
2018), http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/07/11/an-analysis-of-blacklivesmatter-and-other-
twitter-hashtags-related-to-political-or-social-issues/.
22 Id
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in the 1930s,2 3 indicate that the antiauthoritarian attitudes toward the
Trump White House resonate with a broader swath of Americans than the
small minority actively engaging in protests.
Interestingly, the same Pew study also found prevalent use of
#MAGA, indicating support for President Trump's policies during the
same time period, which reinforced the notion that strands of both
authoritarianism and antiauthoritarianism exist simultaneously in
American culture.2 4 This makes sense as the two concepts act as different
sides of the same coin. Indeed, results from a psychological study of an
earlier time that saw increased levels of both authoritarianism and
antiauthoritarianism in America in the wake of the 9/11 terror attacks
suggest that authoritarianism and antiauthoritarianism exist as different
poles of a single spectrum.25 Furthermore, the study found that
authoritarian and antiauthoritarian rhetoric frequently occurred within the
same argument by the same actor, which lead to the conclusion that
authoritarianism/antiauthoritarianism are cultural traits rather than
individual personality traits.2 6 In other words, as individual Americans
respond to President Trump either positively or negatively on an
emotional level, they may be accessing cultural traits of authoritarianism
and antiauthoritarianism as tools to express positivity or negativity.2 7
While the public often views courts and judges in the American legal
system as ostensibly non-partisan, they nevertheless possess access to the
same cultural tools of authoritarianism and antiauthoritarianism.2 8 A brief
examination of select cases from the early years of the Trump presidency
reveals that courts do sometimes couch their decisions in authoritarian or
23 See Megan Garber, 'First They Came': The Poem of the Protests, THE ATLANTIC
(Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2017/01/first-they-came-
poem-history/514895/.
24 ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 21.
25 See Andrew J. Perrin, National Threat and Political Culture: Authoritarianism,
Antiauthoritarianism, and the September 11Attacks, 26 POL. PSYCHOL. 167, 187 (2005) ("The
paper suggests that instead of a simple threat-authoritarianism causal link, authoritarianism and
antiauthoritarianism are paired elements ofpolitical culture that are invoked together in the face
of a national threat.").
26 See id. at 167, 188.
27 See id at 188.
28 See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (pre-enforcement action against
the President, seeking to prohibit implementation and enforcement of the Presidential
Proclamation that banned entry by nationals from Muslim countries); Regents of Univ. Cal. v.
U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 2018) (action brought against Department
of Homeland Security based on rescission ofDeferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA));
Regents ofthe Univ. ofCal. v. U.S. Dep't ofHomeland Sec., 279 F. Supp.3d 1011 (N.D. Cal.
2018) (seeking to enjoin rescission of DACA).
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antiauthoritarian styles. Trump v. Hawaii is an example of an authoritarian
decision, which upheld President Trump's final attempt at a travel ban.
2 9
In upholding the executive order, the Court emphasized the President's
authority to regulate immigration.30 The Court buttressed the authority by
noting that Congress had delegated it and that the delegating statute
granted the President broad discretion.3 1 The Court stated that the statute
"exudes deference to the President in every clause."3 2 The Court
ultimately held that the statute "vests the President with 'ample power' to
impose entry restrictions."3 The emphasis on deference to presidential
power takes a decidedly authoritarian turn. Conversely, for an example of
judicial antiauthoritarianism one can look to California federal litigation
in which an injunction prevented the Trump Administration from halting
the DACA program.34 Whereas the Supreme Court in Trump v. Hawaii
emphasized the President's power,3 5 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit chose to emphasize the effect of power on individuals by using the
sympathetic story of Dulce Garcia, whom the court asserts "embodies the
American Dream," 36 as bookends to its discussion of the relevant law.
3 7
Furthermore, while the opinion acknowledges the power of the executive
branch in immigration, it emphasizes the accountability that accompanies
power:
The Executive wields awesome power in the enforcement of our nation's
immigration laws. Our decision today does not curb that power, but rather
enables its exercise in a manner that is free from legal misconceptions and is
democratically accountable to the public. Whether Dulce Garcia and the
hundreds of thousands of other young dreamers like her may continue to live
productively in the only country they have ever known is, ultimately, a choice
29 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2408, 2423 (2018).
30 See id. at 2408 (recognizing that the President has "broad discretion" to suspend the
entry of aliens into the United States, and that President Trump lawfully exercised that
discretion).
31 Id.
32 id.
3 Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2408 (quoting Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S.
155, 187 (1993)).
3 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476 (9th
Cir. 2018); see also Regents ofthe Univ. ofCal. v. U.S. Dep't ofHomeland Sec., 279 F. Supp.3d
1011 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
3 Trump, 138 S. Ct. 2392 at 2408 ("By its plain language, [the statute] grants the
President broad discretion to suspend the entry of aliens into the United States . .. [and] vests
the President with ample power to impose entry restrictions .....
36 Regents, 908 F.3d at 485.
" Id at 520.
2652020]
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for the political branches of our constitutional government. With the power to
make that choice, however, must come accountability for the consequences.38
Similarly, in issuing the injunction that formed the basis of the
appeal, Judge Alsup acknowledged the executive branch authority9
before identifying limits on such authority,4 0 ultimately holding that the
government had transgressed those limits. 4 Judge Alsup also engaged in
some world-class trolling-quoting President Trumps' tweets that were
sympathetic to DACA, the program the Trump Administration sought to
halt.4 2 In issuing and upholding the injunction, both Judge Alsup and the
Ninth Circuit found the decision to halt DACA to be "arbitrary and
capricious,"43 which is a term of art within administrative law" that
carries connotations critical of authority.4 5 Thus, both courts and
individuals tap into the cultural concepts of authoritarianism and
antiauthoritarianism.
Reactions to judicial opinions that invoke authoritarian or
antiauthoritarian styles tend to vary based on the viewpoint of the reactor.
A common refrain leveled against antiauthoritarian decisions in
particular, however, is that they are politically-motivated decisions of
"activist judges."4 6 For instance, in response to the DACA decisions
38 Id
3 See Regents, 279 F. Supp.3d at 1018-19 ("All agree that a new administration is entitled
to replace old policies with new policies so long as they comply with the law.").
40 See id. at 1019, 1037-44, 1046. The Court considered whether the new administration
terminated DACA based on a mistake of law rather than in compliance with the law." Id. at
1018-19.
41 Regents, 279 F. Supp.3d at 1046.
42 See id. at 1047. President Trump tweeted, "Does anybody really want to throw out
good, educated and accomplished young people who have jobs, some serving in the military?
Really! . . . " Id. Additionally, he tweeted, "Congress now has [six] months to legalize DACA
(something the Obama Administration was unable to do). If they can't, I will revisit this issue!"
Id.
43 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 511 (9th
Cir. 2018); Regents, 279 F. Supp.3d at 1046.
4 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) ("[T]he reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions
of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the applicability of the
terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall ... hold unlawful and set aside agency
action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... arbitrary, capricious . . . ").
45 See Arbitrary, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining "arbitrary" as
"founded on prejudice or preference rather than on reason or fact"); Capricious, BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining "capricious" as "contrary to the evidence or established
rules of law").
46 See Katia Dmitrieva, Sessions Takes On 'Activist' Judges Slowing Down Trump's
Agenda, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 10, 2018, 3:37 PM),
266 [Vol. 38:259
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discussed above, Attorney General Sessions strongly criticized the
decisions as being activist and as lacking respect for "constitutional
responsibilities." 4 7 While criticisms of this nature tend themselves to
conform to partisan objectives, judicial opinions consistently labeled as
activist do typically feature a court actively rejecting authority put before
it.48
This article will argue that the rejection of what scholars otherwise
view as controlling legal authority lies at the heart of judicial activism.
Furthermore, it will argue that judicial activism itself channels the
antiauthoritarian current in American culture (and in English culture
predating its importation to America). Part II will examine the extensive
scholarly writings already existing on judicial activism in order to identify
common themes and to explore to what extent scholars have arrived at a
consensus definition of judicial activism. Part III will then show that
judicial activism may better be understood within the context of law as
culture and will offer an updated definition of judicial activism that
accounts for a cultural component. Part IV will then delve into expressions
of antiauthoritarianism in broader, non-legal Anglo-American culture to
demonstrate under what circumstances Anglo-American culture actively
encourages antiauthoritarian behavior and attitudes. It will do so
specifically through the lens of recurring cultural motifs of outlaws and
pirates. Part V will then analyze four sets of judicially activist decisions
to gauge the extent to which the decisions align with culturally appropriate
exercises of antiauthoritarianism. The first set of decisions will consist of
United States Supreme Court decisions that scholars commonly describe
as activist. If judicial activism is indeed a cultural phenomenon, however,
then one would expect it to be more commonplace than a handful of high
profile and oft-discussed Supreme Court decisions cherry picked from
throughout history. Therefore, the second and third sets of decisions will
comprise United States Supreme Court cases from the 2017-2018 term
and cases from courts other than the United States Supreme Court. The
fourth set of decisions to be analyzed will be a selection of "problem
cases," which are activist cases that even apologists of judicial activism
decry, and non-activist cases that nonetheless face criticism for their
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-10/sessions-takes-on-activist-judges-
slowing-down-trump-s-agenda.
4 See id. ("I am shocked by the actions of certain judges who fail to respect the
constitutional responsibilities of the executive and legislative branches.").
48 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (overruling Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) ("We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine
of 'separate but equal' has no place.").
2020] 267
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results. Ultimately, this article will argue that assessing judicial activism
through the cultural prism of acceptable antiauthoritarianism provides a
tool to differentiate between proper and improper judicial activism.
II. ON JUDICIAL AcTivIsM
The term "judicial activism" entered the public consciousness in
1947 when famed historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. used the term to
describe a wing of the Supreme Court in a short piece for Fortune
magazine.4 9 The act of judicial activism certainly existed before the
coining of the term-after all, a hundred and thirty-odd years before the
Fortune piece, Marbury v. Madison invalidated a statute5 0 and created the
process of judicial review," which besides being itself activist, enabled
all subsequent activism. Schlesinger's pithy phrase drew increased
attention to the phenomenon.
While not truly a legal piece itself, Schlesinger's article not only
prompted a robust scholarly debate on the subject of judicial activism-
one estimate asserted that Schlesinger's term appears in law review
articles at the rate of 450 times per yea52-but also largely helped frame
the debate. Schlesinger's article provided thumbnail sketches of the
Justices as people to provide a snapshot of the Court at a particular
moment in time.5 For example, Schlesinger describes Justices Rutledge
and Murphy with a mix of physical characteristics, personality traits, and
mannerisms: "Rutledge, with his honest and friendly face, rocking and
squirming in his chair; Murphy, grinning or glum under bushy
eyebrows[.]"5 4 Schlesinger described the other justices similarly.
Additionally, Schlesinger extended the thumbnail sketch tone to his
49 See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Supreme Court: 1947, XXXV FORTUNE 73, 74
(Jan. 1947).
50 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803).
51 Id at 177-78. The Court stated:
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution
apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably
to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution,
disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules
governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.
Id. at 178.
52 Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meanings of "Judicial Activism", 92 CAL.
L. REV. 1441, 1442 (2004).
s3 See Schlesinger, supra note 49, at 73.
5 Id
ss See id.
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description of judicial activism itself, presenting the concept as a "great
debate" between "judicial activists" and "champions of self-restraint," at
least partially driven by personal clashes.56 He then presented the
ideologies of the two sides of the debate in a single paragraph: "In brief,
the Black-Douglas wing appears to be more concerned with settling
particular cases in accordance with their own social preconceptions; the
Frankfurter-Jackson wing with preserving the justiciary in its established
but limited place in the American system."5 7
Thus, Schlesinger's famous piece focused mostly on superficial
characteristics and did not provide an in-depth framework for an ideology
of judicial activism. What Schlesinger did do, however, is identify the
existence of differing attitudes about the role of the Court held by
members of the Court itself" and present the tension between those
elements as representing a unique tipping point with potential
ramifications for the unfolding of American history.59 While Schlesinger
oversold the latter point a bit-noting in conclusion that the tension's
"wise resolution could easily make this Court, with its remarkable abilities
and its agreement on a wide range of constitutional fundamentals, one of
the great creative Courts of history"60 -he astutely observed that the
"conflict on the Court, if it can be restrained from intellectual and personal
extremes, may lead to a debate in the most fruitful tradition of American
political thought."6 1
Schlesinger's pithy phrasing, his vague and stylistic definition ofhis
terms, and his suggestion that the issue nonetheless amounted to history
unfolding before his readers' eyes combined to set the table for a plethora
of scholarship on judicial activism and its role in American society.62
Because of the vagueness in Schlesinger's Fortune piece, scholars writing
on judicial activism enjoy wide latitude in their approaches to the topic,
which has led several of them to allege widespread disagreement on the
56 Id. at 76, 78-79.
* Schlesinger, supra note 49, at 201.
* See id. (noting that "[t]he Black-Douglas group believes that the Supreme Court can
play an affirmative role in promoting the social welfare; the Frankfurter-Jackson group
advocates a policy of judicial self-restraint.").
5 See id ("[T]he clash ofjudicial personalities has transformed [the questions at issue]
from mere marginal divergencies to into a fundamental conflict over the proper function ofthe
judiciary in a democracy.").
6 Id. at 212.
61 Schlesinger, supra note 49, at 212.
62 See generally id.
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topic.63 When one views the collective scholarship as a whole, however,
certain trends emerge. First, scholars tend to agree that judicial activism
is both ubiquitous and bipartisan.' Second, scholars tend to discuss
judicial activism in normative terms, often negatively,6 5 though some
scholars play the role of judicial activism apologists. Third, scholars tend
to offer improved definitions for identifying judicial activism.66
Furthermore, the offered definitions converge on something resembling a
consensus.6' Let us examine each of these trends in turn.
A. Ever-present Activism
Despite Schlesinger's attempt to portray the balance on the Supreme
Court in 1947 between the activists and the champions of restraint as a
unique tipping point in history,6 8 legal scholars rightly point out that
concern over the proper role of judges and courts in American society
certainly existed prior to 1947.69 For example, Kmiec sees that common
law asked the same question as the pre-twentieth century discussions
asked regarding the role of "judicial legislation."7 A number of other
scholars point to the debates housed in The Federalist for evidence of
early debate on the role of the Supreme Court in particular.7 For instance,
63 See, e.g., Craig Green, An Intellectual History ofJudicial Activism, 58 EMORY L. J.
1195 (2009) (defining a functional concept of activism based on unenforced norms ofjudicial
propriety); William P. Marshall, Conservatives and the Seven Sins ofJudicial Activism, 73 U.
COLO. L. REv. 1217 (2002) (identifying seven indices ofjudicial activism rather than defining
the term by use of a single definition); Lori A. Ringhand, Judicial Activism: An Empirical
Examination of Voting Behavior on the Rehnquist Natural Court, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 43
(2007) (focusing on an empirical examination on how recent United States Supreme Court
justices have in fact exercised judicial power); Eric J. Segall, Reconceptualizing Judicial
Activism as Judicial Responsibility: A Tale of Two Justice Kennedys, 41 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 709
(2009) (correlating judicial activism to judicial responsibility).
6 See, e.g., Green, supra note 63, at 1197; Marshall, supra note 63, at 1217; Ringhand,
supra note 63, at 45; Segall, supra note 63, at 709.
65 See, e.g., Green, supra note 63, at 1199; Marshall, supra note 63, at 1217-18 n.3;
Alpheus Thomas Mason, Judicial Activism: OldandNew, 55 VA. L.REv. 385,389,391(1969);
Segall, supra note 63, at 709-10.
6 See, e.g., Kmiec, supra note 52, at 1463-65; Segall, supra note 63, at 710--11.
67 See Segall, supra note 63, at 719 ("Although the tests vary in style and substance, one
common theme is the importance of examining the results reached by the Supreme Court.").
68 See Schlesinger, supra note 49, at 201.
69 Kmiec, supra note 52, at 1444.
70 Id. at 1444-45.
7i Rebecca L. Brown, Activism is Not a Four-Letter Word, 73 U. COLO. L. REv. 1257,
1257-58, 1271 (2002); Archibald Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism or
Self-Restraint, 47 MD. L. REv. 118, 119-20 (1987); Segall, supra note 63, at 714 n.18.
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Segall, Cox, and Brown all invoke The Federalist No. 78 as evidence that
the founders saw the role of the Court as worthy of public debate.7 2 Other
scholars similarly reference The Federalists Nos. 48, 739,74 and 51."
Beyond establishing the existence of debate on the role of the Court
prior to Schlesinger's tipping point, scholars also document the Supreme
Court's activist behavior in eras other than the one that Schlesinger
witnessed.76 Indeed, in one of the more comprehensive looks at the history
of judicial activism, Craig Green asserts that modem focus on
Schlesinger's term draws attention away from the fairly strong tradition
of Supreme Court activism in the United States, noting that "confusion
and disdain over the term 'judicial activism' have obscured a deeper
concept of judicial activism that is a pillar of our legal system."7 7 He goes
on to describe four eras of controversial judicial conduct in United States
history: the Lochner era, during which the Court invented the
constitutional right to contract amongst other pro-industry, anti-statutory
regulation decisions;7 the post-Civil War decades, during which the
Court eviscerated the meanings of constitutional liberty and equality as
provided by the Reconstruction Amendments, reversed a constitutional
ban on paper money, and even helped decide a presidential election
(though the Justices did this as members of the 1876 Electoral
Commission and not as a body of the Court);79 the Dred Scott era, during
which the Court departed from precedent and struck down the Missouri
Compromise in order to bolster the institution of slavery;s and the
Marshall Court decades, during which the Court established the concepts
of judicial review and implied congressional authority." Astute readers
may note that Green's eras of activism include the early republic, the
antebellum period that succeeded the early republic, the
reconstruction/post-civil war years following the antebellum period, and
72 Brown,supra note 71, at 1271 n.62; Cox, supra note 71, at 119-20 n.7; Segall,supra
note 63, at 714 n.18.
7 Greg Jones, Proper Judicial Activism, 14 REGENT U. L. REv. 141, 151 n.58 (2001).
74 Saikrishna Prakash, Are the Judicial Safeguards ofFederalism the Ultimate Form of
Conservative Judicial Activism?, 73 U. COLO. L. REv. 1363, 1377 n.48 (2002).
1 Kevin Jefferies, Judicial Activism and the Necessity ofAuxiliary Precautions, 43 S.
TEX. L. REv. 213 (2001).
76 See Green, supra note 63, at 1198 (discussing the role of the Supreme Court during
the Obama administration).
n Id.
7 Id. at 1209-10.
7 Id. at 1211.
80 Green, supra note 63, at 1213-14.
" Id. at 1215-16.
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the Gilded Age/turn-of-the-century era that succeeded Reconstruction.82
In other words, Green views judicial activism as essentially a constant in
pre-twentieth century America. No wonder he describes it as a pillar of
our system.
Other scholars identify eras of judicial activism similarly to Green.
For instance, Judge William Wayne Justice also points to the Marshall
Court, the Dred Scott era, the "separate but equal" and Lochner eras; he
then adds the New Deal era, the Warren Court, and the Rehnquist Court.8 3
He thereby demonstrates that the constant ofjudicial activism did not end
in the twentieth century.84 Amusingly, Judge Justice characterizes the
constant nature of judicial activism with this little gem of snark: "[o]ne of
the longest running dramas in American political life may be entitled
appropriately 'The Quest for Constitutional Meaning.""' Archibald Cox
similarly notes that the independent judiciary constitutional interpretation
is a constant (and in his view essential) process throughout American
history. 8 6 He describes the process as existing between the poles of
judicial activism and judicial restraint, both of which he views as having
existed throughout U.S. history.87 Additionally, Alpheus Thomas Mason
notes that the Supreme Court has been "an instrument of government,
actively involved in politics" from Marbury onwards. Mason then
identifies the usual suspects: the Marshall Court, the Dred Scott era, the
Plessy era, and the Warren Court.8 9 He asserts that the Lochner era from
1890 to 1937, however, represents the "greatest period of judicial pre-
eminence in the Court's history." 90 Rogers and Vanberg also view the
Lochner era as the most extreme era of judicial activism.91 Thus, legal
82 Id. at 1256.
83 William Wayne Justice, The Two Faces ofJudicialActivism, 61 GEO. WASH. L.REv.
1,2-6 (1992).
' See id. at 3 ("The notion that the judiciary must invalidate unconstitutional
government actions has since become an established part of our constitutional system, and has
been recognized as such for at least the past century and a half.").
85 Id.
86 See Cox, supra note 71, at 118-19.
87 See id. at 121-22 ("The varieties ofcurrent opinion concerning the proper role ofthe
Supreme Court in constitutional interpretation can best be pictured by imagining two lines
drawn horizontally from left to right across a piece of graph paper, each linking two magnetic
poles, pulling Justices and observers in opposite directions.").
8 Mason, supra note 65, at 386.
89 See id. at 387, 389.
9 Id. at 389.
9 See generally James R. Rogers & Georg Vanberg, Resurrecting Lochner: A Defense
of Unprincipled Judicial Activism, 23 J. L., ECON., & ORG. 442 (2007) (arguing that judicial
review still works to improve the overall quality of legislation).
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scholars have established the widespread existence of judicial activism
throughout United States history notwithstanding Schlesinger's
description of a pivotal moment.
A significant conclusion that follows from the temporal ubiquity of
judicial activism in the United States takes the form of the realization that
acts ofjudicial activism do not come solely from proponents of any single
political philosophy. Several scholars note that the original complaints of
judges overstepping their role came from progressives bemoaning the
Lochner era Court's invalidation of statutes aimed at promoting social
welfare.92 These same scholars also point out the conservatives' later
criticism of the progressive Warren Court.9 3 In response to the extreme
conservative criticism directed at the Warren Court's activism, some
scholars have taken steps to demonstrate that the conservative Rehnquist
Court engaged in just as much activism as its more liberal predecessor.94
In particularly persuasive fashion, Ringhand uses an empirical model to
demonstrate that "conservative justices as well as their more liberal
counterparts actively 'replace' legislative choices with their own preferred
outcomes, and they do so at a roughly equal pace . . . "95 Even some
conservative-leaning scholars acknowledge that the Rehnquist Court
veered into activism at times.96
To account for the bipartisan, or perhaps more accurately extra-
partisan, nature of widespread judicial activism in our society, Cox
provides a useful biaxial model for thinking about judicial opinions. In his
model, opinions lie in one of four quadrants based on how liberal,
conservative, activist, or restrained they are.97 Under this model, "liberal"-
refers to opinions that "tend in varying degrees to see the proper role of
all branches of government as the active promotion of human freedom and
92 See Brown, supra note 71, at 1259-60; see also Segall, supra note 63, at 716.
9 See Segall, supra note 63, at 714-15. The Warren Court's decisions on prayer in
school, one person/one vote, and criminal procedure are just some of the debates that lead to
conservative criticism. Id.
94 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levenson, Understanding the Constitutional
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REv. 1045, 1081, 1092 (2001); Peter M. Shane, Federalism's Old Deal:
What's Right and Wrong with Conservative Judicial Activism, 45 VLL. L. REv. 201, 204
(2000).
s Ringhand, supra note 63, at 45.
96 See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 63, at 1232-36 (describing the Rehnquist Court as
activist, but in an acceptable way); Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative
Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REv. 1139, 1210-15 (2002) (depicting the Rehnquist Court as activist
but in an acceptable, Burkean way).
" See Cox, supra note 71, at 121.
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equality," 9 8 while "conservative" opinions "insist that the proper role of
government is confined to the preservation of public order, health, safety,
and morality." 9 9 Cox's model is useful as a tool because it enables the
evaluation of individual opinions in positive or negative terms depending
upon the values of the observer, while treating absolute activism and
absolute restraint as extremes on a spectrum-either of which can be
invoked by observers to criticize an opinion. This is crucial because
recognizing the widespread occurrence of judicial activism from all
angles of the political spectrum renders it essential to be able to evaluate
the phenomenon of judicial activism in normative terms. This leads us to
the second broad trend in the scholarly treatment of judicial activism:
normative judgment.
B. Judging the Judges: Normative Treatment of Judicial
Activism
As one would expect of legal scholars, much of the scholarly
commentary on judicial activism adopts normative terms in its discussion.
Legal scholars' normative treatment of judicial activism runs the gamut
from critically negative to positive apologies, with gradations in between.
Let us examine the poles before turning to the middle ground.
1. Negative Views ofJudicial Activism
Arguably, the primary critique of judicial activism derives from the
notion that by engaging in activism, courts (particularly the Supreme
Court) improperly insert themselves into the political process and subvert
the public will by replacing it with their own. This critique was first issued
in the seminal (and sarcastically titled) work, The Least Dangerous
Branch," and has been referred to and referenced by legal scholars as the
counter-majoritarian problem."' Scholars continue to reference counter-
majoritarianism as a problem withjudicial activism.'0 2 It has been equated
9 Id
99 Id.
" See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (Yale Univ. Press, 2d ed. 1962).
101 Marshall, supra note 63, at 1219-20 ("Counter-Majoritarian Activism: the reluctance
of the courts to defer to the decisions of the democratically elected branches.").
102 See, e.g., Bradley C. Canon, Defining the Dimensions ofJudicial Activism, 66
JUDICATURE 236, 239-40 (1983) ("Majoritarianism ... suggests that when the Court exercises
judicial review, it substitutes another public policy for that enacted by elected representatives
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with an equally disturbing transparency problem, in which the Court fails
to disclose its inherently political and less-than-fully-democratic
process.1o 3 Similarly, Balkin and Levenson describe the activism of the
Rehnquist Court as a "constitutional coup,"' 0setting aside the popular
will (and the popular vote in the 2000 Presidential election).'
Beyond the counter-majoritarian critique, constitutional originalists
also view judicial activism as a societal ill.1 0 6 Notably, the originalist
critique differs from the counter-majoritarian critique; as the former
accepts that the Court, by failing to strike down statutes that conflict with
the Constitution, would be failing its duty,'0 7 and the latter views the Court
setting aside democratically passed legislation as inherently
problematic.' 0o Thus, originalists only view opinions as problematically
activist if they lead "courts to adopt doctrines that contradict the text of
the Constitution either to uphold or nullify a law."' 09 Regardless of
in Congress, state legislatures, or city councils. Such action is often seen as illegitimate from
the perspective of democratic theory.").
10 See Segall, supra note 63, at 710-14.
The essential problem . .. has been the shared assumption among liberals and
conservatives that judicial activism can be measured in some meaningful way by
examining how often the Court invalidates state and federal legislation; how
frequently the Court overturns its own precedent; and under what circumstances the
Court reverses the decisions of other political actors.
Id. at 710.; see also ERIC J. SEGALL, SUPREME MYTHS: WHY THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT A
COURT AND ITS JUSTICES ARE NOT JUDGES 3-7 (ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2012) ("[T]he Justices
employ the fancy but misleading jargon of constitutional law . .. to hide the personal value
judgments that actually support their decisions .... Thus . . . the Justices fail to act like true
judges.").
104 Balkin & Levenson, supra note 94, at 1050.
1os Id. at 1045-50.
106 See Randy E. Barnett, Is the Rehnquist Court an "Activist" Court? The Commerce
Clause Cases, 73 U. COLO. L. REv. 1275, 1279 (2002). Barnett states:
We should adhere to the original meaning because-right here, right now-we are
committed to a written constitution, and the whole reason for putting a constitution
in writing is to constrain the behavior ofpolitical andjudicial actors. Ifthose actors
can change its meaning as they desire and in the absence ofa written amendment, the
written constitution will have failed in its principal purpose, and our commitment to
it rings hollow.
Id. at 1279.
107 See id at 1276, 1279-80 ("Though we may often disagree over whether a particular
statute is constitutional, we all share the conviction that the Supreme Court and lower federal
courts should strike down or nullify unconstitutional laws enacted by legislative majorities.").
"o See Marshall, supra note 63, at 1220 ("Counter-Majoritarian Activism: the reluctance
of the courts to defer to the decisions of the democratically elected branches."); Canon, supra
note 102, at 240 ("Such action is often seen as illegitimate from the perspective of democratic
theory.").
09 Barnett, supra note 106, at 1276.
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allowing for nullification of unconstitutional statutes, originalists
nonetheless advocate strenuously for a restrained, non-activist judiciary,
going so far as to suggest that here would be no way to restrict judges
from arbitrary behavior if not for originalist restraint:
On one side of the debate are the "originalists," or interpretivists, who maintain
that the provisions of the Constitution mean what the Founders intended them
to mean-the "original intention." On the other side are the nonoriginalists, or
noninterpretivists, who insist that judges are free to interpret the Constitution in
light of what is "good and just" and the like. 10
Of course, some critics of judicial activism include more than one
complaint in their critiques. For example, Marshall includes both the
counter-majoritarian and originalist critiques among his "seven sins of
judicial activism""' Marshall proceeds to add abandoning precedent,
acting extra-jurisdictionally, engaging in "judicial creativity," employing
overly aggressive remedies, and misusing judicial power to accomplish
partisan objectives to round out his seven sins."2 Additionally, some
works on judicial activism, while not offering full critiques themselves,
clearly rest on negative assumptions about judicial activism."3
Thus, critics of judicial activism cast the phenomenon as one of
irresponsible judges dangerously drifting out of their lanes by failing to
respect an array of positive ideas, such as the democratic process, the
Constitution, or stare decisis. Yet, judicial activism is not without its
defenders, who attempt to counter the criticisms.
2. Activism Apologists
Perhaps unsurprisingly, commentary from sitting federal judges
comprises some of the strongest defense of judicial actions labeled as
activist. For instance, Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., sitting in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit at the time of his writing,
asserts that the Framers of the Constitution recognized that an independent
"o Raoul Berger, New Theories of "Interpretation:" The Activist Flight from the
Constitution, 47 OHIO ST. L. J. 1, 2 (1986).
II See Marshall, supra note 63, at 1219-20.
112 Id. at 1220.
113 See, e.g., Kmiec, supra note 52, at 1463-76 (using loaded terms such as "judicial
legislation" and "result-oriented judging" when describing judicial activism).
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judiciary is essential to a functioning constitution,1 14 and that the doctrines
of federalism and separation of powers merely limit courts' exercise of
judicial power rather than ban it altogether."' Johnson counters criticism
that courts go beyond interpretation, pointing out that the critiques suffer
from three fallacies: the "watershed fallacy," or the assumption of
activism as a new phenomenon and not as a key feature of the American
political system from its inception;116 the "elitist fallacy," or the
assumption that judges only use the Constitution as a mere sounding board
for personal philosophy;"' and the "omnipotence fallacy," or the
overstatement of the power of federal courts and the dangerousness of
judges." 8 For Johnson, judicial activism is a feature of the system and not
a bug."9 Indeed, he asserts that the sudden appearance of strict
constructionists in the 1970s (which he attributes to the rise of Nixon)
actually represents a more revolutionary development than the activism
of the Warren Court.'2 0 Johnson's fellow judge, William Wayne Justice,
sitting in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas,
also espouses the view thatjudicial activism is a feature of the system and
indeed is a necessary tool for federal judges to actually do their job.'
2 ' For
Judge Justice, critiques of activism amount to mere rhetorical devices for
attacks on the necessary functions of federal courts, namely determining
constitutional meaning and providing remedies for cases in
controversy.122 Similarly, Judge J. Skelly Wright, a senior member of the
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit at the time of his writing, views
activism as impossible to avoid without abdicating the judge's duty,
noting that "the inevitable politics of judging should not be apologized
for, but accepted and even welcomed." 23 Judge Kim McLane Wardlaw,
sitting in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit at the time of her
114 See Frank M. Johnson, Jr., In Defense ofJudicial Activism, 28 EMORY L. J. 901, 902
(1979).
115 Id.
116 Id at 903
117 Id. at 903.
11 Johnson, supra note 114, at 903.
"1 See id. at 904 (describing "activism" as "an old and persistent theme").
120 Id. at 904-05.
121 See generally Justice, supra note 83 (noting that "[r]emedial activism, the ordering of
detailed remedies in institutional reform cases, is nothing more than an application of the
traditional role of the judge: to resolve disputes and remedy wrongs.").
122 See id. at 4-5, 10-13.
123 See J. Skelly Wright, The Judicial Right and the Rhetoric ofRestraint: A Defense of
Judicial Activism in an Age of Conservative Judges, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 487, 520
(1987).
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writing, goes even further than her colleagues. She uses the teachings of
Judge Cardozo, whom she portrays as the greatest expert in history on the
art of judging, to show that all but the easiest cases use at least elements
of activism.12 4 She takes it a step further by asserting that empathy and a
desire forjustice are positive traits injudges, noting that "[t]here are times
when the judge's sense of justice necessarily comes to bear on his
consideration of the legal problems with which he is presented. Black
robes are not magical garments; they cannot transform the wearer from
human to automaton."1 25 For the sitting judges who have chosen to write
on the subject, judicial activism, and even a personal sense of justice,
represent essential tools in the fulfillment of their duties.
This is not to say that sitting judges are the only ones who defend
judicial activism; several legal academics and scholars also enter the fray.
In his defense of judicial activism, Kevin Jefferies echoes the view of the
judges that activism is a feature of the system that the Framers of the
Constitution designed, going so far as to borrow from The Federalist No.
51 for both his title and introductory quote: "A dependence on the people
is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has
taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions."'26 For Jefferies,
"the freedom given federal judges by their lifetime appointment, the basis
of judicial activism, is a critical check on the executive and legislative
branch and an essential ingredient in the prevention of tyranny[.]"1 2 7
Rogers and Vanberg take the defense of judicial activism to the extreme
by portraying it as a key component of the system. They advocate for even
unprincipled judicial activism as a net good, as the "shadow of judicial
review" exerts a positive effect on the amount of effort legislators put into
drafting laws.12 8 While she does not go quite as far as Rogers and
Vanberg, Rebecca L. Brown also recognizes that the problematic nature
of Lochner stems not from its activism.'2 9 In fact, Brown asserts that:
124 See generally Kim McLane Wardlaw, Umpires, Empathy, and Activism: Lessons
from Judge Cardozo, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1629, 1632 (2010) (noting Judge Cardozo's
success in discrediting the legal formalists' view of the law as a closed system of preordained
rules).
125 Id at 1645.
126 Jefferies, supra note 75, at 213 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
127 Id. at 230.
128 Rogers & Vanberg, supra note 91, at 443.
129 Brown, supra note 71, at 1265-68 (noting that "[t]he error of Lochner was not its
activism any more than it was the Court's protection of rights or its suspicion of legislative
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. .. the ability of a Court to defend its understanding of good government and
its own role in constitutionalism-is the true measure of a successful Court, and
not whether it follows precedent, not whether it reaches out to answer questions
not raised by the parties, not whether it fails to give deference to coordinate
branches of government; in short, not whether it is activist. Rather, we must
judge a court by how it has justified its particular brand ofactivism.
130
Thus, apologists of judicial activism counter its critics by
emphasizing the necessary and beneficial roles an independent judiciary
and judicial activism play in our constitutional system. Of course, there is
a lot of room in the middle between the critics of judicial activism on the
one hand, and its apologists on the other. Let us now examine the middle
ground.
3. The Middle Ground: Mixed Bags and Begrudging Realists
Two approaches primarily occupy the ground between the poles of-
judicial activism's critics and defenders. One may describe the first
approach as consisting of scholars who view judicial activism as a mixed.
bag in that some instances of judicial activism are defensible, while other
instances go beyond the pale. For example, Mason notes that the rationale
behind activism has shifted over time from one of holding property rights
sacrosanct during the Lochner era to a rationale focusing on egalitarianism
and civil liberties.13 1 This recognition of change over time and differing
rationales for differing circumstances allows for observers to view
different instances of activism with different levels of approbation or
praise. Similarly, Young thinks that the term judicial activism should be
stripped of its unwavering negative connotation.
1 3 2 Thus, cases should be
viewed on their own individual circumstances as to whether their activist
elements are justified.' 3 3 For Young, judicial activism that proceeds in a
Burkean manner is defensible and perhaps even warranted in some
circumstances.1 34 Judge Frank H. Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit is
the rare judge who, instead of wholly defending judicial activism, argues
moves. Its error was an impoverished and inflexible understanding of what the common good
might entail during a period of ongoing radical social and economic changes.").
130 Id at 1270.
131 See Mason, supra note 65, at 389.
132 See Young, supra note 96 at 1162-63.
133 See id. at 1163.
134 Id at 1209.
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that activism, like judicial restraint, can be good or bad depending upon
the circumstances.13 5
In addition to the commentary calling for instances of judicial
activism to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, scholars also offer means
by which to perform that case-by-case analysis in order to separate the
good acts of activism from the bad. Cox, who provides the biaxial model
for evaluating degrees and political direction of activism described above,
argues that activist courts can be true to the framers' original intent by
embodying revolutionary principles in their activism.136 Jones also seeks
to distinguish between what he terms proper and improper activism,
identifying the former as activism focused "on policing the boundaries of
power between the jurisdictional government entities within our system,"
and the latter as activism that "seeks to substantively correct perceived
injustices in the law through the use of any number of extra-constitutional
sources."13 7 Both of these systems rely on measuring activist acts against
foundational principles in determining the propriety of the activism.1 3 8
Yet, there seemingly exists a second approach to the middle ground
in the debate between critics and defenders of judicial activism, an
approach traveled by pragmatists and realists who begrudgingly accept
the continued existence of judicial activism and write in hopes of
mitigating its harms to fashion it into something more or less useful. Judge
Richard Posner joins his former colleague from the Seventh Circuit in the
middle ground via this second path, expressly rejecting normative
academic studies of judicial activism in favor of a more realist, social
scientific approach.1 39 Posner views the Supreme Court as being on the
way to becoming a constitutional Court, instead of acting as a general
purpose appellate court, a role it increasingly leaves to the Circuits.140
Furthermore, Posner views constitutional courts as inherently political.14 1
For Posner, there is no point in condemning judicial activism since it is
likely to continue or even increase as the Court's role shifts; instead he
seeks to constrain it by advocating for a culture of "modest political
135 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Do Liberals and Conservatives Difer in Judicial
Activism?, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1401, 1403-5 (2002).
' Cox, supra note 71, at 129-31 (arguing that "the Court should confine the grants of
federal power and the guarantees of individual rights to the particular instances that the framers
specifically had in mind").
13 Jones, supra note 73, at 144-45.
138 See id at 179.
139 See Richard A. Posner, A Political Court, 119 HARv. L. REv. 32, 32-33 (2005).
140 Id. at 37-38.
141 Id. at 38-39.
280 [Vol. 38:259
OUTLAWS, PIRATES, JUDGES
judging," arguing that judges should feel "bashful about being a politician
in robes" and strive for a high threshold for invalidating actions of other
branches.142 Green somewhat echoes Posner's position in that he views
judicial activism as an unavoidable byproduct of our independent
judiciary, and advocates for establishing strong cultural beliefs about the
roles of courts as a check to discourage judges from abusing their
power.143
The focus on the role of culture in molding judicial activism is
interesting. Parts III, IV, and V of this article will argue that culture does
indeed inform judicial activism, though not necessarily in the way that
Posner and Green hope. Indeed, a cultural lens may ultimately be useful
for determining good judicial activism from bad and may look more like
Cox's revolutionary principles than Posner's culture of modesty. Before
we can fully explore the role of culture in judicial activism, however, we
should address the third broad trend found in scholarly writing on judicial
activism: offering improved definitions forjudicial activism as a term.
C. Converging on Consensus: Defining Judicial Activism
Complaints of the lack of an adequate definition of the term "judicial
activism" remains a common, almost universal, refrain in scholarly
writing on the subject.'" At least a couple of commentators attribute the
wide variety of approaches taken to defining judicial activism to the
vagueness inherent in Schlesinger's original use of the term.145 Despite
the chronic protestations, however, as scholars continue to offer variations
on a definition,14 6 something akin to consensus emerges on at least a base
definition of judicial activism.
This baseline consensus essentially converges upon the concept that
judges engage in activism when they reject authorities' observers would
otherwise expect them to follow. In the most basic form, this would be
when judges depart from legislation that they should be applying or when
142 Id. at 54.
143 Green, supra note 63, at 1224-26.
14 See, e.g., Canon, supra note 102, at 237; Frank B. Cross & Stefanie A. Lindquist, The
Scientific Study ofJudicial Activism, 91 MINN. L. REv. 1752, 1753-54 (2007); Easterbrook,
supra note 135, at 1401; Green, supra note 63, at 1197-98; Kmiec, supra note 52, at 1143;
Ringhand, supra note 63, at 43; Caprice L. Roberts, In Search ofJudicial Activism: Dangers in
Quantifying the Qualitative, 74 TENN. L. REv. 567, 567-68 (2007); Segall, supra note 63, at
719.
145 Green, supra note 63, at 1201-03; Kmiec, supra note 52, at 1149-50.
' Roberts, supra note 144, at 576.
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they depart from precedent. For instance, in constructing her empirical
model, Ringhand uses the invalidation of statutes and the overturning of
precedent as indicators of activist judicial behavior.14 7 Similarly, Roberts
distinguishes between "institutional external activism" and "institutional
internal activism.1 4 8 The former she describes as courts exceeding the
normal constraints on their role exercised by core doctrines, such as
separation of powers and federalism,149 and the latter which she depicts
as judges exceeding constraints within the judicial branch, such as
precedent.1" 0 She uses this distinction to evoke the same notion of courts
rejecting authorities of other branches or states or rejecting their own
precedents.1 s'
Of course, many observers view courts as constrained by more than
legislation and precedent. Roberts adds another category to her
external/internal model-"decisional process activism." 5 2 As such, she
views courts as also constrained by accepted canons of interpretation.'
Roberts' final two categories, "empty political epithet" and
"multidimensional activism," are either not really activism or some
combination of her first three categories involving judges rejecting
authority that they should ordinarily follow.' 54 Similar to Roberts, Canon
adds an element of interpretive fidelity (albeit one he ties to originalism)
to elements of majoritarianism-respecting legal authorities created by
the democratic branches-and interpretive stability-adhering to
precedent-in identifying constraints judges normally follow.' Canon
adds three additional elements for measuring activism that all deal with
the extent to which courts set policy and measure degrees to which judges
exceed their role rather than identify constraints on the judicial role
itself.'5 6 Thus, the policy-centered elements necessarily flow from the
"' Ringhand, supra note 63, at 44.
148 See Roberts, supra note 144, at 580-91.
149 Id. at 580-81.
150 Id. at 578-88.
1' Id at 588-89.
152 See Roberts, supra note 144, at 591.
is3 See id. at 591-95 (stating that a classic example of decisional process activism arises
from the textual interpretation of a statute or the Constitution).
154 Id. at 595-600.
"' Canon, supra note 102, at 239.
116 The three additional elements Canon includes are substance/democratic process
distinction, specificity of policy, and availability of an alternate policymaker. Id.
Substance/democratic process distinction is the degree to which judicial decisions make
substantive policy rather than affect the preservation of democratic political processes. Id.
Specificity of policy relates to the extent to which a judicial decision, instead of agencies or
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elements based on the rejection of authorities to which judges should
normally defer. Both Young and Marshall similarly define judicial
activism as comprising the rejection of authorities from other branches,
the denial of original intent, and the disregard of precedent."' Like Canon,
Young adds additional factors dealing with breadth of remedy that flow
from those dealing with rejecting authority."' For Young, all of the
factors clearly involve a rejection of proper authority, as he states that the
behaviors he describes "are linked by a common thread: they all involve
a refusal by the court deciding a particular case to defer to other sorts of
authority at the expense of its own independent judgment about the correct
legal outcome."15 9 Marshall also adds remedial and procedural elements
that result as consequences from the common elements of rejecting
authorities from other branches, original intent, or precedent.16 0 Thus,
some scholars add departing from the original intent of the framers of the
Constitution as an authority judges are normally expected to follow to the
same extent as they follow legislation and precedent.
Interestingly, there are some commentators that view
originalism/constitutionalism as such a strong constraint that they argue
that courts may engage in activist behavior by not striking down actions
of the other branches that themselves violate the original intent of the
Constitution. For example, Kmiec hedges on the first element of a
definition of judicial activism by adding the qualifier of "arguably
constitutional" to actions of other branches when discussing courts'
obligations to defer to legislation or regulation.161 Additionally, Barnett
opines that constitutional originalism is paramount, alleging that "it is
activist for courts to adopt doctrines that contradict the text of the
individuals, establishes policy. Id. And finally, availability ofan alternate policymaker relates
to the extent to which ajudicial decision supersedes erious considerations ofthe same problem
by other governmental agencies. Canon, supra note 102, at 239.
15 See Marshall, supra note 63, at 1219-20 (discussing counter-majoritarian activism;
non-originalist activism; precedential activism); see also Young, supra note 96, at 1144-45.
18 See Young, supra note 96, at 1144.
SId. at 1145.
'6 See Marshall, supra note 63, at 1219-20. Marshall discusses precedential activism,
which is the failure ofthe courts to defer to judicial precedent; jurisdictional activism, which is
the failure ofthe courts to adhere to jurisdictional limits on their own power; judicial creativity,
which is the creation of the new theories and rights in constitutional doctrine; and partisan
activism, which is the use ofjudicial power to accomplish partisan objectives. Id. at 1220.
161 See Kmiec, supra note 52, at 1463-65 ("[T]he Court is engaging in judicial activism
when it reaches beyond the clear mandates of the Constitution to restrict the handiwork of the
other government branches.").
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Constitution either to uphold or nullify a law."' 62 Thus, a complicating
concept of activist restraint enters the picture upon addition of
constitutionalism as a judicial constraint; the major complication being
that determining the limits of the text/intent/meaning of the Constitution
tends to vary quite a bit depending upon the point of view of the person
doing the evaluating of the judicial behavior, as Cross and Lindquist
note.163
Thus, commentators on judicial activism generally agree that
rejection of authorities that we normally expect courts to follow lies at the
heart of the definition of judicial activism. Commentators also generally
agree, however, that such a definition is not without its limits. Another
limit to the definition, not yet discussed, is that it does not get at why
judicial activism occurs. Incorporating a cultural component to the basic
definition may help to ameliorate the difficulties with a definition based
on rejection of authority. Let us now turn our attention to the interplay
between law and culture.
III. LAW AS CULTURE
Culture is undoubtedly a rather broad concept that may be even more
difficult to define as a term than judicial activism. One legal anthropology
scholar recognizes the flexibility of-and therefore the difficulty in
defining-the term: "the concept of culture belongs to a rich and contested
intellectual history in which it has functioned frequently and effectively
as an analytical device."" For culture to be a useful analytical device for
the purposes of the current paper, however, we will need to define the
concept in slightly more specific terms. James M. Donovan defines
culture by the role it plays: "Culture provides a template of default ways
of being in a wide assortment of social and existential contexts. Culture is
not determinative, but it does provide ready-made solutions to the most
commonly encountered problems of living and especially of group
living." 6 5 This role-based definition accurately serves our purposes of
looking at how judges' own culture influences their decision-making
when they encounter the common problem (at least for them) of the
162 Barnett, supra note 106, at 1276.
163 See Cross & Lindquist, supra note 144, at 1760 (noting that the determination of
judicial activism is contingent on the commentator's view of what the Constitution requires).
'" Naomi Mezey, Law as Culture, 13 YALE J.L. &HUMAN. 35, 40 (2001).
165 JAMES M. DONOVAN, LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 227 (AltaMira
Press, 2008).
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difficult case. Lawrence Rosen also employs a role-based definition of
culture, which he views as providing the capacity to categorize human
experience.16 6 Furthermore, Rosen views cultural responses based on
categories as having largely replaced humane instinct, even before such a
time as we evolved into modem homo sapiens.167  A recent,
comprehensive bird's-eye view of the totality of the human experience
similarly asserts that a cognitive revolution occurred in humans around
70,000 years ago and enabled human language to express imagined
concepts and events, ultimately leading humans towards the path of global
dominance.' 6 Notably, the work emphasizes that the resulting capacity to
use one's imagination enabled cooperation of increasingly large groups of
humans in vastly complex social structures through concepts such as
shared myth and religion.1 69 This opinion correlates well with Donovan's
definition of culture as providing solutions to the problems of group
living.
Law, as much as shared myth, enables cooperation of large groups
of people; indeed, law may even be seen as one of the shared imaginings
that make ordered civilization possible. Donovan describes law as "one
piece of social reality that it has been useful to treat as a separate idea."170
In essence, law is one of several categories of cultural norm that act
together for social regulation, although a category of norm that
anthropologists recognize by certain specific characteristics.171 As such,
"law can be seen as one (albeit very powerful) institutional cultural actor
whose diverse agents (legislators, judges, civil servants, citizens) order
and reorder meanings."'72 Rosen discusses the interrelation between law
and culture even more forcefully, noting that:
[L]aw is so inextricably entwined in culture that, for all its specialized
capabilities, it may, indeed, best be seen not simply as a mechanism for attending
166 See LAWRENCE ROSEN, LAW AS CULTURE: AN INVITATION 3 (Princeton University
Press, 2006) ("[T]his categorizing capacity-the key feature of the concept of 'culture'-was
not something that happened after we became human but something that actually preceded our
present speciation.").
167 Id
168 See YUVAL NOAH HARARI, SAPIENS: A BRIEF HISTORY OF HUMANKIND 20-25
(HarperCollins Publishers, 2014) (noting that genetic mutations changed the inner wiring of the
brains of Sapiens, enabling them to think in unprecedented ways and to communicate using an
altogether new type of language).
169 Id. at 24.
170 DONOVAN, supra note 165, at 4.
171 See id. at 10.
72 Mezey, supra note 164, at 45.
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to disputes or enforcing decisions, not solely as articulated rules or as evidence
of differential of power, and not even as the reification of personal values or
superordinate beliefs, but as a framework for ordered relationships, an
orderliness that is itself dependent on its attachment o all the other realms of its
adherents' lives.17 3
If one views law as a social construct that acts as a single strand of a
broader cultural weave in this manner, then the value of examining law
through a cultural lens becomes evident. As Sarat and Simon put it, the
cultural study of law "invites us to acknowledge that legal meaning is
found and invented in the variety of locations and practices that comprise
culture, and that those locations and practices are themselves
encapsulated, though always incompletely in legal forms, regulations, and
legal symbols."17 4 Therefore, the study of law resembles other forms of
cultural inquiry because of its connection to specific localities. Naturally,
it follows that the study of law could benefit from anthropological
techniques, or at the very least by acknowledgment of its anthropological
nature."' Clifford Geertz, one of the pioneers of legal anthropology, sums
it up succinctly: "law is local knowledge not placeless principle."17
Accordingly, to fully understand the law of a specific place, one must
understand its culture, and vice versa. As Rosen states, "[t]o understand
how a culture is put together and operates, therefore, one cannot fail to
consider law; to consider law, one cannot fail to see it as part of
culture."'77 Thus, for Rosen, cultural assumptions fill in gaps of
knowledge and can even underpin the findings of fact in a legal
controversy. 7 To illustrate his position, Rosen uses judges and jury
members as an example. Those individuals may evaluate the sincerity of
a witness based on body language, which of course varies culturally from
place to place.179 Ultimately, Rosen advocates for the practical application
1 ROSEN, supra note 166, at 7.
'4 Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon, BeyondLegal Realism?: Cultural Analysis, Cultural
Studies, and the Situation ofLegal Scholarshp, 13 YALE J.L & HUMAN. 3, 21 (2001).
17 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE
ANTHROPOLOGY 167 (Basic Books, Inc., 1983).
176 Id. at 218.
177 ROSEN, supra note 166, at 5.
178 See id. at 5-6 ("It is no mystery that law is part of culture, but it is not uncommon for
those who, by profession or context, are deeply involved in a given legal system to act as if'The
Law' is quite separable from other elements of cultural life.").
17 Id. at 117 ("[T]he ways in which even the same orientations [of a person's body
language] may be displayed obviously vary enormously from one cultural or subcultural context
to another.").
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of legal anthropology in any number of legal situations.'1 s Rosen's
advocacy echoes that of Donovan and Anderson, who argue that the
practical application of cultural data can help settle individual legal
disputes."' Donovan and Anderson take the argument further, however,
by also suggesting that the theoretical and practical application of
anthropology greatly benefits the study oflaw. 182 They assert that "some
concepts that appear to be wholly legal in nature will, upon closer
scrutiny, reveal themselves to be dependent upon anthropological ideas in
research."l8 3 Donovan and Anderson illustrate this idea using
international human rights law, which they portray as deriving from
changing social values.18 4 They ultimately conclude that "[a]nthropology
can clarify for law other concepts besides human rights. Religion . .. is
another. Law could also benefit from an anthropological understanding of
'race'.""' The propriety or impropriety of judicial activism could be one
such concept that anthropology can help clarify.
How then does an analysis of law as culture proceed? Mezey
postulates three models of viewing law as culture:
Law as culture might be understood in a number of different ways .... First,
one might analyze the relationship between law and culture by articulating the
unspoken power of law in the realm of culture. Second, one might think about
the relationship by emphasizing the enduring power of culture over legal
institutions and decision-making. Lastly, one might reject the distinctions
suggested by a "relationship" between the two and seek to synthesize law and
culture, by pointing to the ways in which they are one and the same.186
Mezey's second model would be the one to employ when assessing
how broader culture influences the legal culture that produces widespread
judicial activism. She expounds upon this model by noting that:
180 See generally LAWRENCE ROSEN, THE JUDGMENT OF CULTURE: CULTURAL
ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LAW (Routledge, 2018) (considering, through an anthropology
lens, how cultural assumptions are built into American legal decision-making by demonstrating
the many ways courts express their understanding of human nature).
' See JAMES M. DONOVAN & H. EDWIN ANDERSON, III, ANTHROPOLOGY & LAW 29-
31 (Berghahn Books, 2003).
182 See id. at 144 ("Law benefits from an infusion of anthropological thinking[.]").
183 Id.
" See id. at 144-64 (discussing international human rights law).
185 DONOVAN & ANDERSON, supra note 181, at 164.
1 Mezey, supra note 164, at 47.
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[L]aw as culture might mean emphasizing the persuasive power of culture, a
power that might be conceived as either excluding the possibility of a legal realm
that could be articulated without recourse to culture or establishing the
possibility of cultural regulation that functioned independently of law. 187
She describes the culturally relevant considerations that play into the
regionally varying practices of speed limit enforcement as an example of
this sort of relationship, none of which actually meet the letter of the
written law. 188
The influence of cultural practices over law is not limited to citizens
and law enforcement, as in the speed limit example. Other scholars
contributing to the legal anthropology field provide examples of judges
and lawmakers also swaying under the influence of culture in reaching
their decisions. Examples from Rosen include the unenforceable nature of
unconscionable contracts making it into the Uniform Commercial Code
from common law decisions by judges who followed cultural concepts of
fairness rather than the letter of the law; ' the evidentiary rules providing
exceptions to the exclusion of hearsay as reflecting cultural assumptions
about when people are likely to tell the truth;1 9 0 John Marshall's
invocation of public opinion in applying a cultural value of justice in
formulating a framework for (admittedly limited) indigenous rights in the
Cherokee cases; "' and the long-standing Anglo-American practice ofjury
nullification, in which juries refuse to apply legal remedies when those
remedies are based on cultural assumptions not shared by the jurors.'92
Donovan provides a helpful visualization of how law relates to
various other types of cultural norms. He divides norms into four broad
types: "norms of morality," which espouse ideals of what people ought to
do;19 3 "typical norms," which identify what people are typically expected
to do;19 4 "minimal norms," which serve as the baseline for what people
18 Id. at 49.
" See id. at 49-51 ("Despite the existence of formal law, it is culture that actually
determines the 'legal' speed limit.").
189 ROSEN, supra note 166, at 30-32.
190 See id. at 94-95 ("Anglo-American evidentiary rules, which tend to be fashioned as
if a jury were present, are not, of course, mere artifacts of the law but reflections of their
cultures' assumptions.").
91 Id. at 153-54 (noting that Marshall was "extremely clever" in his reference to public
opinion when addressing the legality of the Cherokee Indian situation).
192 Id. at 156-57.
'9 DONOVAN, supra note 165, at 245.
194 Id
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must do (i.e., the floor of social responsibility rather than the ceiling);'
and "phative norms," which indicate expressive behaviors that establish
mutual belonging to a given group.19 6 He then further describes his
normative typology as existing along two axes: one running between
"cohesion" and "control," which indicates whether the norm's
enforcement takes the form of internalization or external pressure;19 7 the
other running between "substantive," which indicates what must be done,
and "procedural," which rather indicates how it must be done. 98 Under
this model, Donovan views law as a prime example of "minimal norms"
in the cohesion-procedural quadrant-law very much sets the minimum
standards of socially acceptable behavior, describes in detail how to
comply with said socially acceptable behavior, and is internalized by
those subject to it."' In the cohesion-substantive quadrant, adjoining law
on one side, however, lies the norms of morality, or the ideal norms, which
Donovan equates with religion or similar deeply-held moral beliefs.2 00
Custom, representing typical norms, and etiquette, representing phative
norms, occupy the other quadrants.2 0 1 Donovan stresses that none of the
types of norm operate truly on their own: "[e]ach type of norm generates
its own bonds of social relationships, and it is the latticed network of all
of them that allows the group to cohere over time." 202 For purposes of
examining how extralegal cultural norms influence judicial behavior, let
us focus on Donovan's cohesion quadrants featuring internalized norms.
The constraints upon judges discussed in Part I, such as the
expectation that they defer to the acts of the more democratic branches or
that they adhere to precedent, can be viewed as minimal norms,
procedurally focused, and internalized by legal practitioners. In this way
they act as any other feature of our law. What happens though, if these
baseline expectations conflict with ideal norms representing our deepest-
held cultural values? Robert Post contemplates such clashes in identifying
authorities that courts look to for interpretive guidance beyond the
authority of the law in interpreting the Constitution.20 3 In particular, Post
195 Id.
196 Id. at 245.
19 DONOVAN, supra note 165, at 245-46, 249.
198 Id. at 246.
199 Id. at 247-49.
200 Id. at 249.
201 Donovan, supra note 165, at 249.
202 Id. at 250.
203 See Robert Post, Theories of ConstitutionalInterpretation, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 13,
14-29 (1990) (recognizing that judges require and must be able to articulate a "theory" of
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notes that courts sometimes recognize what he terms "an authority of
ethos," which manifests as "responsive interpretation."2 0 This responsive
interpretation "engages in an ongoing process of national self-definition,
[and] appeals to the authority of the Constitution as, for lack of a better
word, ethos."2 0 5 Post views the directness of an inquiry of responsive
interpretation helpful for courts considering constitutional cases because
it "empowers them to uncover and articulate substantive constitutional
values."2 0 6 The discussion of ethos and constitutional values recognizes
that greater cultural values, perhaps what we might term ideal norms, do
influence judicial decision-making.
Thus, accounting for the interplay of law and other cultural norms
could improve our understanding of judicial activism. After all, Rosen
notes:
That fit of legal sensibility and cultural style will take place whether we try to
ignore it or not, and it is by grasping the very nature of culture and law's place
within it-grasping the symbiotic relation of a culture's constituent domains and
the ways in which they are interlaced-that the place of law in the ordering of
relationships may most realistically be sought.20 7
How might the consensus definition ofjudicial activism be altered to
account for other cultural values? This article offers the following
suggestion: judicial activism is an antiauthoritarian rejection of the
ordinarily accepted constraints on judicial decision-making when those
constraints conflict with deeply held cultural values of liberty, equality,
and social justice.
To support this definition, however, we would ideally find other
examples of the expression of antiauthoritarian ideals in a positive light
within Anglo-American culture. Let us turn to a brief examination of these
elements within our culture. For purposes of keeping the scope of this
project manageable, let us limit the examination to two recurring cultural
motifs that glorify antiauthoritarianism in the contexts of liberty, equality,
and social justice: the outlaw and the pirate.
constitutional interpretation when the meaning of any statute or other legal instrument is
ambiguous).
204 Id. at 23.
205 Id. at 26.
206 Id. at 28.
207 ROSEN, supra note 166, at 199.
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IV. OUTLAWS, PIRATES, AND THE GLORIFICATION OF
ANTIAUTHORITARIANISM IN ANGLO-AMERICAN CULTURE
Before proceeding with our examination of depictions of outlaws and
pirates in Anglo-American culture, a few points of order need
establishing. First, the argument here is not that Anglo-American culture
is inherently antiauthoritarian as a whole, but merely that there exists a
current of antiauthoritarianism as one stream among many within the
culture. Second, tropes of outlaws and pirates are far from the only
representation of the current of antiauthoritarianism within our culture.
Further depictions, however, are beyond the scope of this work. Third, the
examination will proceed primarily by looking at Anglo-American
literary and popular culture. As evidenced by Harari's description of a
cognitive revolution,20 8 the stories we tell hold great power and influence
over how we interact with the world. In fact, Rosen describes culture as a
"storehouse of stories" and notes that law as a component of culture also
engages in storytelling. 2 09 Therefore, it makes sense to look at our
culture's most explicit stories. Finally, the reader will no doubt have
noticed use of the phrase "Anglo-American" in describing the culture
underpinning our legal system. Not only did the United States inherit the
English language and the common law from our former colonial
sovereign, but we also inherited cultural tropes, including those of outlaws
and pirates. Let us begin our examination at the English beginnings of the
tropes.
A. Outlaws and Pirates in Early English Literature
When one thinks of outlaws in an English context, doubtless a certain
denizen of Sherwood Forest springs to mind; yet the outlaw literary
tradition actually predates tales of Robin Hood. In their academic
compilation of Middle English Robin Hood texts, Knight and Ohlgren
identify and reproduce several precursor tales featuring earlier outlaws
and similar themes as more familiar stories.21 0 For instance, Hereward the
Wake is an outlawed Anglo-Saxon who uses a bow and gathers an armed
208 See HARARI, supra note 168, at 20-25 ("The appearance of new ways of thinking and
communicating, between 70,000 and 30,000 years ago, constitutes the Cognitive Revolution.").
209 ROSEN, supra note 166, at xii-xiii.
210 See generally ROBN HOOD AND OTHER OUTLAW TALES (Stephen Knight & Thomas
Ohlgren eds., Medieval Institute Publications, 1997) (discussing medieval tales of Robin Hood
and other outlaws).
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band to oppose a tyrannical king, namely the Conqueror himself.2 1 None
of the earlier outlaws, however, have enjoyed the staying power of Robin
Hood in the public consciousness. Indeed, in discussing Robin Hood's
lasting legacy, Knight and Ohlgren note that:
Only King Arthur of the medieval heroes has had such longevity, but there
are striking differences. One is that where Arthur represents authority under
some serious and ultimately tragic form of pressure, the Robin Hood tradition
always presents, in many varied forms, resistance to authority the two heroes
in a real sense are the reflex of each other.2 12
The earliest surviving mentions of Robin Hood occur as brief
mentions in various chronicles, though Robin Hood clearly existed in the
oral tradition prior to being put to paper, as "rymes of Robyn Hood" are
directly referenced by the drunken priest representing Sloth in The Vision
ofPiers Plowman: "I kan noght parfitly my Paternoster as the preest it
syngeth/But I kan rymes of Robyn Hood and Randolf Erl of Chestre."2 13
An example of an early chronicle's treatment of Robin Hood occurs in a
chronicle from the early fifteenth century: "Litil lohan and Robert
Hude/Waythman war commendit gud;/in Ingilwode and
Bernnysdaile/Thai oyssit al this tyme thar trawale."2 1 4 Note how well this
brief mention conforms to modem versions of the legend; not only is Little
John present, but the outlaws ply their trade from forests and receive
public praise.
More fleshed out versions of the Robin Hood legend survive in a
handful of ballads from a similar time period as Wyntoun's chronicle.2 1 5
One of the earliest surviving ballads, Robin Hood and the Monk, features
familiar themes such as the presence of some of the more noted merry
men, Robin's opposition to the "schereff of Notyngham," and "mery
Scherwode."2 1 6 Robin Hood and the Potter, a slightly later ballad dated to
211 STEPHEN KNIGHT & THOMAS OHLGREN, Hereward the Wake, in ROBIN HOOD AND
OTHER OUTLAW TALES, supra note 210 (Michael Swanton, trans., 1997).
212 STEPHEN KNIGHT & THOMAS OHLGREN, Robin Hood and Other Outlaw Tales:
General Introduction, in ROBIN HOOD AND OTHER OUTLAW TALES, supra note 210.
213 William Langland, William Langland's The Vision of Piers Plowman, UNIV.
MICHIGAN, https://quod.1ib.umich.edu/c/cme/PPILan/1:6?rgn=div1;view-fulltext (last visited
Mar. 15, 2020).
214 Andrew of Wyntoun, Orygynale Chronicle (c. 1420), in ROBIN HOOD AND OTHER
OUTLAW TALES, supra note 210.
215 See ROBIN HOOD AND OTHER OUTLAW TALES, supra note 210.
216 STEPHEN KNIGHT & THOMAS H. OHLGREN, Robin Hood and the Monk, in ROBIN
HOOD AND OTHER OUTLAW TALES, supra note 210; STEPHEN KNIGHT & THOMAS H.
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the latter half of the fifteenth century, fleshes out the themes more fully
and features what Knight and Ohlgren refer to as the "full and free ethics
of the forest."21 7 Robin Hood and the Potter also features an early act of
wealth redistribution, as Robin, having either sold all the Potter's wares
at ridiculous prices or given them to the Sheriff s wife as part of a ruse to
infiltrate the Sheriffs house in disguise, pays the potter significantly more
than the wares' worth with money liberated from the Sheriff:
Potter, what was they pottys worthe
To Notynggam that Y ledde with me?"
"They wer worthe to nobellys," seyde he,
"So mot Y treyffe or the;
So cowed Y had for tham,
And Y had be there."
"Thow schalt hafe ten ponde," seyde Roben,
"Of money feyre and fre;
And yever whan thow comest to grene wod,
Wellcom, potter, to me.218
Forced wealth redistribution from the elite classes of society to
common folk such as this became so intrinsic to the Robin Hood myth
over the course ofthe late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries that John
Major saw it as reason to include Robin Hood and Little John in his
Historia Majoris Britanniae.219
Thus, even from its late medieval origins, the portrayal of Robin
Hood involves three broad recognizable themes. First, Robin Hood is
expressly an antiauthoritarian figure.22 0 This can be seen through his
struggles with the sheriff, an office which like its forerunner, the shire-
OHLGREN, Robin Hood and the Potter: Introduction, in ROBIN HOOD AND OTHER OUTLAW
TALES, supra note 210.
217 STEPHEN KNIGHT & THOMAS H. OHLGREN, Robin Hood and the Potter:
Introduction, in ROBIN HOOD AND OTHER OUTLAW TALES, supra note 210.
218 STEPHEN KGHT & THOMAS H. OHLGREN, Robin Hood and the Potter, in ROBIN
HOOD AND OTHER OUTLAW TALES, supra note 210.
219 John Major, Historia Majoris Britanniae (1521), in ROBIN HOOD AND OTHER
OUTLAW TALES, supra note 210.
220 STEPHEN KNIGHT & THOMAS H. OHLGREN, Robin Hood and Other Outlaw Tales:
General Introduction, supra note 210 ("[T]he Robin Hood tradition always presents ...
resistance to authority.").
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221 reenedreeve, repsented the authority of the crown at the local level.2 22 Robin
Hood's antiauthoritarian attitude can also be seen through his flexible
attitude towards societal roles of class, such as when he takes on the
persona of the Potter.2 2 3 Second, Robin Hood and his followers live free
in an idyllic forest, outside the bounds of law and society's restrictions.2 24
Not only that, but Robin Hood's men feel free to mock their leader, who
responds in companionable fashion, such as when he loses a bet with Little
John over his inability to beat the Potter in a fight.2 5 Third, Robin Hood
and his companions stand up for people from the lower social orders
against those society places above them.2 2 6 In a way, the latter two themes
serve as justification for approbation of the first. Robin Hood's
antiauthoritarianism is celebrated by the resulting freedom and justice. I
would argue that these literary themes align with cultural ideal norms of
liberty, equality, and social justice.
The Robin Hood mythology and its themes definitely struck a chord
in the collective English imagination over the following centuries.2 2 7 in
addition to being featured in an ever increasing number of ballads, Robin
Hood also made frequent appearances on stage.2 2 8 interestingly, authority
figures over time attempted to temper the antiauthoritarian appeal of
Robin Hood, either by banning performances of the Robin Hood myth or
by retconning the hero as a genteel nobleman.22 9 The attempts at
minimizing his antiauthoritarian influence failed, however, as Robin
Hood emerged as a national hero in the eighteenth century-an "exemplar
of the 'free-born Englishman,' [and] an ardent defender of the political
221 See Shire-reeve, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999) (defining shire-reeve as
"[t]he reeve of a shire, or county").
222 See Reeve, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999) (defining reeve as "a
ministerial officer ofhigh rank having local jurisdiction; the chiefmagistrate ofa hundred").
223 See STEPHEN KNIGHT & THOMAS H. OHLGREN, Robin Hood and the Potter, in ROBIN
HOOD AND OTHER OUTLAW TALES, supra note 210
224 STEPHEN KNIGHT & THOMAS H. OHLGREN, Robin Hood and the Potter: Introduction,
in ROBIN HOOD AND OTHER OUTLAW TALES, supra note 210.
225 STEPHEN KNIGHT & THOMAS H. OHLGREN, Robin Hood and the Potter, in ROBIN
HOOD AND OTHER OUTLAW TALES, supra note 210.
226 STEPHEN KNIGHT &THOMAS H. OHLGREN, Robin Hoodandthe Potter: Introduction,
in ROBIN HOOD AND OTHER OUTLAW TALES, supra note 210.
227 See STEPHEN KNIGHT& THOMAS H. OHLGREN, Robin Hood and Other Outlaw Tales:
General Introduction, in ROBIN HOOD AND OTHER OUTLAW TALES, in ROBIN HOOD AND
OTHER OUTLAW TALES, supra note 210.
228 Id.
229 See STEPHANIE L. BARCZEWSKI, MYTH AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY BRITAIN: THE LEGENDS OF KING ARTHUR AND ROBIN HOOD 21-25 (Oxford
University Press 2000).
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rights of the people at large."230 Two widespread publications of
collections containing various versions of the Robin Hood myth in 1765
and 1795 assisted his rise to the status of national hero.2 3 1
The outlaw's popularity received another boost in the early
nineteenth century with Sir Walter Scott's Ivanhoe, originally published
in 1820.2 Ivanhoe features Robin Hood as Locksley, who plays a key
role in rescuing the heroes of the piece from the villains by leading his
merry men in an assault on the castle where the heroes face
imprisonment.2 33 Scott portrays Locksley as a free Saxon nobleman
rebelling against Norman tyranny, with Locksley describing the Saxon
leader as "the friend of the rights of Englishmen."2 34 Scott's portrayal is
in line with the Whig view of history, which dominated nineteenth century
Britain and emphasized elements of freedom and individual rights in
English history. 2 3 5 Part of this involved glorifying the Saxon past and
attributing the development of freedom-curbing institutions to the
continental influence of the Normans.2 3 6 While Scott primarily wrote as a
novelist, a number ofWhig historians also attempted to fit Robin Hood
into a narrative of traditional English freedom standing up to absolutist
institutions created by Norman monarchs by including him amongst the
supporters of Simon de Montfort in his rebellion against Henry II.237
Montfort's rebellion, while ultimately unsuccessful, saw advances in the
role of Parliament primarily through the inclusion of representatives for
commoners for the first time.23 8 Thus, Whiggish historians going to
230 Id. at 21, 30-31.
231 See THOMAS PERCY, RELIQUES OF ANCIENT ENGLISH POETRY CONSISTING OF OLD
HEROIC BALLADS, SONGS AND OTHER PIECES OF OUR EARLIER POETS (Henry B. Wheatley,
ed., 1765) ("The chief heroes of the older ballads were King Arthur and his knights, Robin
Hood, and Guy of Warwick .... From a local hero [Robin Hood] grew into national fame, and
superseded Arthur in popular regard."); JOSEPH RITSON, ROBIN HOOD: A COLLECTION OF ALL
THE ANCIENT POEMS, SONGS, AND BALLADS, NOW EXTANT, RELATIVE TO THAT CELEBRATED
ENGLISH OUTLAW (1795).
232 SIR WALTER SCOTT, IVANHOE (Lerner Publishing Group, Inc. 2014) (1820).
233 Id. at 208, 227.
234 Id. at 208.
235 See generally Whiggism, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIBERTARIANISM,
https://www.libertarianism.org/encyclopedia/whiggism (last visited Mar. 18, 2020).
"Whiggism" refers to the philosophical principles of the British Whig party, which came to be
called the Liberal party. Id.
236 See ERNST BREISACH, HISTORIOGRAPHY: ANCIENT, MEDIEVAL, & MODERN 248-
257 (3d ed. 2007).
237 BARCZEWSKI, supra note 229, at 73-75.
238 See generally ADRIAN JOBSON, THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION: SIMON DE
MONTFORT. HENRY III AND THE BARONS'WAR (2012).
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lengths to place Robin Hood in the historical context of Montfort's
rebellion indicates how strongly the outlaw was associated with liberty
and English rights by the nineteenth century. Furthermore, because of the
author's prominence (which extended to America), Scott's use of the
outlaw cemented Robin Hood in the role of guardian of English liberty
and rights.2 3 9 As Barczewski notes, "Scott's influence upon subsequent
treatments of the legend of Robin Hood can scarcely be exaggerated."24 0
While Sir Walter Scott and the Whigs may have cemented Robin
Hood's place in the popular imagination, the antiauthoritarian themes
promoting liberty, equality, and social justice clearly predated the Whig
revision. It makes sense, then, that one finds similar themes in the early
portrayals of the other grand scofflaw of English tradition: the pirate.
Although English audiences may have been predisposed to positively
receive tales of nautical adventure by the pre-colonial voyage narratives
of Hakluyt and Smith,2 4 1 the nautical trope combined with the outlaw
trope took great effect in a 1724 work entitled A General History of the
Pyrates, published in several editions under the name of Captain Charles
Johnson2 42 (though in actuality most likely written by Daniel Defoe).24 3
In fact, many modem editions of the work list Defoe as the author instead
of Johnson.2 " Regardless of the authorship, the work provides much of
the foundation for the depictions of pirates in subsequent Anglo-American
culture.2 4 5 Though the various editions contain slightly different content,
as some passages occur in one but not another, taken as a whole, A
General History of the Pyrates presents many of the same themes as the
Robin Hood mythology.2 46
First, the antiauthoritarian inclinations of the work's subjects abound
throughout the tales. For instance, Defoe describes the beginning of the
loose collective of pirates on which his work focuses as a direct result of
strict, authoritarian Spanish trade restrictions and the willingness of
239 BARCZEWSKI, supra note 229, at 127, 130.
240 Id. at 129.
241 See, e.g., RICHARD HAKLUYT, THE PRINCIPAL NAVIGATIONS, VOYAGES,
TRAFFIQUES ANDDISCOVERIES OFTHE ENGLISHNATION (1589); JOHN SMITH,THEGENERALL
HISTORIE OF VIRGINIA, NEW ENGLAND, AND THE SUMMER ISLES (Bobbs-Merrill 1970) (1624).
242 See Captain Charles Johnson, A GENERAL HISTORY OF THE PYRATES (2nd ed. 1724).
243 John Robert Moore, Defoe, Stevenson, and the Pirates, 10 ELH 35, 50 (1943).
24 See, e.g., Sandy Hobbs & David Cornwell, Sawney Bean, the Scottish Cannibal, 108
FOLKLORE 49, 51 (1997).
245 See DANIEL DEFOE, A GENERAL HISTORY OF THE PYRATES (Manuel Schonhorn, ed.,
1999).
246 See id
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English authorities in Jamaica to help prosecute violators.24 7 Additionally,
Defoe details multiple instances of pirates accepting the king's
proclamation (offering forgiveness for pirates wishing to go straight), but
subsequently strafing under the restrictions of only attacking ships of
nations at war with England and backsliding into their piratical ways.2 4 8
Second, Defoe's pirates clearly possess an eye for their own liberty
and freedom from governance. Defoe tells how the pirates, looking for a
realm of their own where they can live by their own laws, settle on the
Island of Providence in the Bahamas, a nominally English colony that had
been rendered free territory by destruction and depopulation caused by
Spanish raiding in a previous war.24 9 Much like Robin Hood and his men
chose to live outside the laws of English society by inhabiting the forest,
the pirates chose to live outside English laws in their own version of
wilderness.2 50 Similarly to Robin Hood, Defoe's pirates also do not care
to remain wedded to particular social classes, as can be seen through the
tale of Stede Bonnett, a wealthy and educated member of the planter class
who chooses to forsake his station for the ways of piracy.2 5 1
Third, themes of equality and social justice also recur in Defoe's
work. In describing governance among the pirates, Defoe portrays them
as chaotically democratic and relatively egalitarian in outlook:
Tho' these Pyrates consorted together, they were not under the Government
of one particular Head, as Admiral, but each Captain and Company were
regulated by their own Laws, independently of the rest; nor were the Captains
themselves always obey'd, every thing of Moment being carried by the Vote of
the Company, the Captain having only a double Vote in all Elections; and all
Prizes that were taken, were divided equally between the Men who took them,
whether they were in one Ship or Vessel, or two, or three; the Captains receiving
two Shares, and the Officers a Share and a half, and others a share and quarter,
and a single share to each private Man; but, upon any notable Piece of Service,
the principal Pyrates would take upon them, to give away a quarter, or a half
Share of one Man's, whom they found remiss in their Duty, to another whom
they esteem'd of more Worth and Merit.
252
247 DANIEL DEFOE, A GENERAL HISTORY OF THE ROBBERIES AND MURDERS OF THE
MOST NOTORIOUS PYRATES 43-45 (Garland Publishing ed., 1972) (1724).
248 Id. at 69, 87-88.
249 Id. at 46-47.
250 See id at 47.
251 See DEFOE, supra note 247, at 60.
252 See id. at 46.
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The concepts of democracy, equality, and meritocracy described by
Defoe sometimes extended to the selection of the captains and officers by
the crew, as seen in the election of Bartholomew Roberts following the
death of the crew's previous captain.2 5 3 Th concept of equality amongst
pirates is reinforced by the tales of two woman pirates, Mary Read and
Anne Bonney, who act as normal crew members up until the moment that
they plead pregnancy to escape the gallows.2 5 4 Defoe also portrays
instances of pirate captains adhering to their own concepts of social
responsibility by looking out for their crew members, such as when
Blackbeard raids the Carolinas in search of medicine needed by his
crew.255
While Defoe's pirates did not rise to the level of national hero as
Robin Hood had, almost every named captain who serves as the subject
of one of Defoe's tales meets an ignominious end as an executed
felon25 6-the work did greatly influence a later writer, Robert Louis
Stevenson.257 In turn, Stevenson helped elevate pirates in the public
consciousness by introducing them into children's literature by using
them as the backdrop for his classic coming of age tale, Treasure
Island.2 5 8 While the pirates in Treasure Island largely fill the role of
villains, individual pirates are portrayed more sympathetically. Three in
particular-Billy Bones, Ben Gunn, and Long John Silver-act as
mentors or guides in various ways on the protagonist's journey to
adulthood.2 5 9 Like its forebear, Treasure Island expresses themes of
liberty, equality, and social justice. In terms of liberty, the entire adventure
liberates Jim Hawkins from a life of drudgery as the only son of a
widowed innkeeper.2 6 0 Similarly, the complex but sympathetic figure of
Long John Silver manages ultimately to escape capture.2 6 In terms of
equality, Long John Silver, who is a cripple,2 6 2 sits at the top of the pirate
hierarchy; while young Jim Hawkins who is not the captain, squire, or
doctor, acts as the principal agent of the pirates' downfall by depriving
253 See id. at 161.
254 See id. at 117-34.
255 DEFOE, supra note 247, at 74-75.
256 See id. at 657.
257 Moore, supra note 243, at 50-51.
258 See id. at 42, 50.
259 See generally ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON, TREASURE ISLAND (Oxford University
Press 1963) (1883).
260 Id. at 9, 20.
261 Id at 255.
262 See id. at 55-56.
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them of the ship.2 63 In terms of social justice, Jim Hawkins and his social
betters, including the financier of the expedition, split Flint's treasure
fairly. 26 4 The pirates also operate in a democratic way similar to Defoe's
pirates, as they at one point vote to depose Silver as their leader.2 65 Thus,
Defoe's portrayal of pirates as antiauthoritarian while also acting in some
ways in furtherance of liberty, equality, and social justice (within their
specific society, of course) recurs in Stevenson's famous depiction of
pirates.
As seen through the medieval and early modem depictions of
outlaws, primarily Robin Hood, the appropriation of the figure of Robin
Hood by the Whigs and the similar representations of pirates, English
literary culture contains a current that celebrates certain acts of
antiauthoritarianism. In particular, antiauthoritarianism is celebrated
when it acts in furtherance of or in combination with themes of liberty,
equality, and social justice-norms that were clearly valued by English
society. Let us now look at how these norms, and portrayal of
antiauthoritarianism in their furtherance, transplanted to America.
B. Outlaws and Pirates in Early American Literature
In the field of intellectual history and political culture, noted
historian Bernard Bailyn shows that the revolutionary political ideals held
by the founders of the United States, while influenced by multiple sources,
mainly derived from a fringe English ideology valuing freedom and
equality to the extreme.2 66 Furthermore, Bailyn demonstrates that the
ideas took root and flourished in America to a much greater extent than
they had in England.26 7 Accordingly, the ideal norms of liberty and
equality that existed in England would have transferred to America,
potentially even in stronger form. Indeed, one recent study of the
Declaration of Independence, which in many ways seeks to identify the
core values of a new nation, argues that the document encapsulates deeply
held beliefs of not only freedom, but also equality.
2 6 8
263 See STEVENSON, supra note 259, at 177-79.
264 Id. at 255-56.
265 See id. at 205-11.
266 See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
viii (Belknap Press 1967).
267 Id. at xi.
268 See DANIELLE ALLEN, OUR DECLARATION: A READING OF THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE IN DEFENSE OF EQUALITY 269 (Liveright Publishing Co. 2014) ("Equality is
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Given the transfer and strengthening of these ideal norms, to say
nothing of the continued shared language between the United States and
its former mother country, it should not come as a surprise that depictions
of outlaws and pirates also continued in the new nation. In actuality,
several of the English works discussed were reproduced in American
editions with illustrations provided by American artists.2 6 9 Of these
works, Howard Pyle's The Merry Adventures ofRobin Hood may be the
most significant, for Pyle not only drew the illustrations but also provided
the text for a retelling of the legends.270 And, retelling is what they were,
as Pyle's work largely borrows from the ballads.271 For instance, Pyle
relates a story of Robin Hood and a butcher that retells Robin Hood and
the Potter with only a few slight changes: the substitution of a butcher for
a potter; Robin overpaying the butcher for his wares at the beginning of
the tale rather than the end; and Robin luring the sheriff to the forest with
the promise of great homed beasts instead of offering to lead the sheriff
to Robin Hood.2 7 2 Needless to say, the American editions of the earlier
works continued to express approbation for antiauthoritarian behavior
corresponding to pursuit of liberty, equality, and social justice.2 7 3
American literature, however, also introduced new variations on the
traditional outlaw theme-variations that reflect the opportunities offered
by an untamed frontier. The Turner Thesis, named for historian Frederick
Jackson Turner,2 7 4 holds that a distinct American identity shaped largely
by the shared experiences of conquering a continent frontier by frontier-
albeit stemming from seeds planted by British institutions-emerged after
the United States split from Britain.2 75 While the Turner Thesis may have
been overstated, one can definitely see the influence of the frontier in early
the foundation of freedom because from a commitment to equality emerges the people
itself[.]").
269 See, e.g., HOWARD PYLE, THE MERRY ADVENTURES OF ROBIN HOOD (1883); PAUL
CRESWICK, ROBIN HOOD (N. C. Wyeth illus., 1917); Susan R. Gannon, The Illustrator as
Interpreter: N.C. Wyeth's Illustrations for the Adventure Novels ofRobert Louis Stevenson, 19
CHILDREN'S LITERATURE 90, 91 (1991).
270 See PYLE, supra note 269.
271 See John Cech, Pyle's Robin Hood: Still Merry After All These Years, 8 CHILDREN'S
LITERATURE, 11, 11 (1983).
272 Compare PYLE, supra note 269, with STEPHEN KNIGHT & THOMAS H. OHLGREN,
Robin Hood and the Potter, in ROBIN HOOD AND OTHER OUTLAW TALES, supra note 210.
273 See CRESWICK, supra note 269; Gannon, supra note 269; PYLE, supra note269
274 See BREISACH, supra note 236, at 313 (noting that the thesis "spoke of an American
nation that was unique in character and development" and that it "became America's declaration
of historiographical independence from Europe.").
275 Id. at 314.
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American literature, especially through the depictions of outlaws in two
new forms: the frontiersman, who consciously leaves the restrictions of
society behind, and the gunslinger of the lawless "wild west."
The trope of the frontiersman as an individual who lives outside the
bounds and rules of society entered the public consciousness in a major
way with the publication of five novels by James Fenimore Cooper,
collectively known as The Leatherstocking Tales.2 7 6 Much like Robin
Hood and his men chose liberty by living in the forest outside the bounds
of society, Cooper's protagonist Natty Bumppo (a.k.a. The
Leatherstocking, Hawkeye, La Longue Carabine, Trapper, Pathfinder, or
Deerslayer) seeks freedom on the frontier and struggles when white
society arrives to previously wild or native places.27 7 Furthermore, Cooper
promotes the benefits of the liberty by portraying Bumppo as an ideal, a
man of genuine honesty untouched by the guiles of society.2 7 8 The
Leatherstocking Tales also reflect the ideal of equality, as seen through
the companionship and partnership between Natty Bumppo and
Chingachgook (a.k.a. Sagamore), an American Indian of the Mohican
nation.279 Bumppo highlights the equal nature of their partnership when
comforting Chingachgook following the death of Chingachgook's son,
Uncas:
"No, no," cried Hawkeye, who had been gazing with a yearning look at the
rigid features of his friend, with something like his own self-command, but
whose philosophy could endure no longer; "no, Sagamore, not alone. The gifts
of our colours may be different, but God has so placed us as to journey in the
same path. I have no kin, and I may also say, like you, no people. He was your
son, and a red-skin by nature; and it may be, that your blood was nearer;-but if
ever I forget the lad, who has so often fou't at my side in war, and slept at my
side in peace, may He who made us all, whatever may be our colour or our gifts,
forget me. The boy has left us for a time, but, Sagamore, you are not alone!"
Chingachgook grasped the hand that, in the warmth of feeling, the scout had
stretched across the fresh earth, and in that attitude of friendship, these two
sturdy and intrepid woodsmen bowed their heads together, while scaldin tears
fell to their feet, watering the grave of Uncas, like drops of falling rain.28
276 See generally JAMES FENIMORE COOPER, THE LEATHERSTOCKING TALES (Library
of America 1985).
277 See generally id.
278 See generally id.
279 See generally id.
280 JAMES FENIMORE COOPER, THE LAST OF THE MOHICANS 342 (Modern Library
Classics 2001).
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The death of Uncas also highlights a theme of social justice in
Cooper's work because the passing of Uncas renders Chingachgook the
last of the Mohicans, and represents sorrow at the passing of American
Indian society.281 This is made explicit by Tamenund, an American Indian
sage, who states:
"Go, children of the Lenape; the anger of the Manitto is not done. Why should
Tamenund stay? The pale-faces are masters of the earth, and the time of the red-
men has not yet come again. My day has been too long. In the morning I saw
the sons of Unamis happy and strong; and yet, before the night has come, have
I lived to see the last warrior of the wise race of the Mohicans!" 282
The theme of social justice also plays a prominent role in The
Pioneers, which recounts the verbal struggle between Bumppo, who
advocates for balanced, unwasteful use of natural resources, and the
settlers who bring the wasteful appropriation of resources by
civilization. 2 8 3 Thus, the themes of liberty, equality, and social justice
carry over into the frontiersman as outlaw. While Cooper's portrayal of
the frontiersman features less overt antiauthoritarianism, or at least less
overtly violent antiauthoritarianism-Natty Bumppo's preferred method
of rejecting authority is to disappear into the woods, as at the end of The
Pioneers284-the second form of new outlaw in American literature, the
western gunslinger, takes on a more traditional role of antiauthoritarian
behavior.
While cataloging every dime novel occurrence of the gunslinging
western outlaw is a project beyond the scope of this work, let us look at
one of the more famous examples-The Life and Adventures of Joaquin
Murieta: Celebrated Cahfornia Bandit.28 5 Ridge portrays Murieta as an
initially honest prospector of Mexican descent in California during the
Gold Rush,2 8 6 who eventually violently rejects the authority of the
Americans engaging in a campaign of racially-motivated tyranny and
abuse.2 8 7 In addition to their antiauthoritarian actions, Murieta and his
men enjoy the liberty of the wild hills to which they retreat wreaking
281 See id.
282 Id.
283 See COOPER, THE LEATHERSTOCKING TALES, supra note 276, at 14.
284 See id. at 464-65.
285 See YELLOW BIRD (JOHN ROLLIN RIDGE), THE LIFE AND ADVENTURES OF JOAQUIN
MURIETA: THE CELEBRATED CALIFORNIA BANDIT (Univ. of Oklahoma Press ed. 1955).
286 Id. at 8.
287 Id. at 9-13.
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vengeance upon the Americans.2 8 8 Additionally, as much as Defoe's
pirates showed an egalitarian view towards gender, Murieta and his
bandits include women among them who ride and dress as men.
2 8 9
Furthermore, Murieta creates a network of sympathetic allies, not just
amongst his fellow Mexicans, but also among Indians and a few friendly
Anglos.290 The theme of social justice is also present (as is justice of the
personal vengeance category), as seen through Murieta's motivations for
banditry,2 91 as a way to counter racial oppression2 92 and to avenge his
wronged family members, including his raped wife and his lynched
brother.2 93 Thus, one sees a recurrence of the outlaw themes of
antiauthoritarianism, liberty, equality, and social justice in the literary
depictions of western gunslingers, as seen through the example of Joaquin
Murieta.
While the tropes of outlaws and pirates emigrated to American
literature in both their traditional English and new, distinctly American
forms in the nineteenth century, the invention of new media types in the
twentieth century saw a burgeoning of American pop-culture. Within the
bourgeoning popular culture, depictions of outlaws and pirates
proliferated in a myriad of forms.
C. Mass Media and the Proliferation of Outlaws and Pirates in
Modern Popular Culture
The twentieth century saw an expansion in the ways in which we tell
stories; film, television, popular music, and video games joined traditional
literature of the page and stage as media for expression. Yet, in many
ways, although the methods of storytelling changed, the values expressed
in the stories remained aligned with ideal norms. As new methods of
storytelling emerged, so too did new depictions of outlaws and pirates.
Sometimes the various new media depictions retell familiar tales, and
other times they tell new stories. Recurring throughout the depictions,
however, run the themes of antiauthoritarianism-liberty, equality, and
social justice. Another feature of modern popular culture is the ease with
which it crosses national boundaries (and is sometimes produced by joint,
288 See id. at 14-15.
289 See YELLOW BIRD (JOHN ROLLIN RIDGE), supra note 285, at 29-30.
290 See id.
291 See id. at 8.
292 Id. at 9.
293 YELLOW BIRD (JOHN ROLLIN RIDGE), supra note 285, at 10, 12.
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multinational ventures). In this section we will address depictions
originating from both the United States and the United Kingdom, as we
have already demonstrated shared cultural ideals between the two nations.
Of the familiar literary tales, Robin Hood reappears in new media
perhaps the most often; film versions of the legendary outlaw abound.2 9 4
He also appears in numerous television adaptations.2 95 Additionally, film
and television versions of Ivanhoe feature Robin Hood in his traditional
role.29 6 The film and television versions of Robin Hood tend to lean
heavily into the Whig versions in which Robin advances the cause of
liberty by foiling or helping to foil the tyrannical predations of Prince
John, who is abusing government institutions.2 9 7 Portrayals of Robin
Hood and his band living free in the forest also feature prominently.2 9 8 In
terms of equality and socialjustice, the onscreen portrayals of RobinHood
generally depict a character performing his traditional duty of robbing
from the rich to give to the poor.299 Interestingly, the more recent onscreen
versions of the legend advance the themes of equality and social justice
further, either by introducing a Saracen character,3 00 or by giving Marian
or other female characters more active, heroic roles,301 or both.3 02
Regardless, the Robin Hood mythology's glorification of
294 See, e.g., ROBIN HOOD (Summit Entertainment 2018); ROBEN HOOD (Universal
Pictures 2010); ROBIN HOOD: MEN IN TIGHTS (20th Century Fox 1993); ROBIN HOOD: PRINCE
OF THIEVES (Warner Bros. Pictures 1991); ROBIN AND MARIAN (Columbia Pictures 1976);
ROBrN HOOD (Walt Disney Productions 1973); THE ADVENTURES OF ROBIN HOOD(Warner
Bros. Pictures 1938).
295 See, e.g., Robin Hood (British Broadcasting Co. 2006-2009); Maid Marian and her
Merry Men (British Broadcasting Co. 1989-1994); Robin ofSherwood(HTV 1984-1986); The
Legend ofRobin Hood (British Broadcasting Co. 1975).
296 See, e.g., Ivanhoe (British Broadcasting Co. 1997); Ivanhoe (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
1952).
297 ROBIN HOOD (2010), supranote 294; Ivanhoe (1997), supra note 296; ROBINHOOD:
MEN IN TIGHTS (1993),supra note 294; ROBIN HOOD (1973),supra note 294; Ivanhoe (1952),
supra note 296; THE ADVENTURES OF ROBIN HOOD (1938), supra note 294.
298 ROBIN HOOD (2010), supra note 294; Robin Hood, supra note 295; ROBIN HOOD:
MEN IN TIGHTS (1993), supra note 294; ROBIN HOOD: PRINCE OF THIEVES (1991), supra note
294; ROBIN HOOD (1973), supra note 294; THE ADVENTURES OF ROBIN HOOD (1938), supra
note 294
299 ROBIN HOOD (2010), supra note 294; ROBIN HOOD, supra note 295; ROBIN HOOD:
MEN IN TIGHTS (1993), supra note 294; ROBIN HOOD: PRINCE OF THIEVES (1991), supra note
294; ROBIN HOOD (1973), supra note 294; THE ADVENTURES OF ROBIN HOOD (1938), supra
note294.
3 ROBIN HOOD (2018), supra note 294; ROBIN HOOD: MEN IN TIGHTS (1993), supra
note 294; ROBIN HOOD: PRINCE OF THIEVES (1991), supra note 294; Robin ofSherwood, supra
note 295.
301 Maid Marian and her Meny Men, supra note 295.
302 Robin Hood, supra note 295.
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antiauthoritarianism in the advancement of liberty, equality, and social
justice remains very much alive in our cultural consciousness.
Similar to Robin Hood, pirates have appeared in Hollywood while
continuing to echo the themes of their literary roots. The most direct
portrayal of one of the literary narratives of pirates is the 1950 film
adaptation of Treasure Island,30 3 though later adaptations involving
Muppets and an animated transposition to outer space also hew
surprisingly closely to Stevenson's plot and characterization. 0 As such,
the themes of liberty, equality, and social justice that occur in the novel
recur in the films. The 1950 film also famously featured actor Robert
Newton's exaggerated English West Country accent as pirate dialect so
effectively that most subsequent portrayals of pirate speech followed it.3 0 5
It also spawned International Talk Like a Pirate Day, further keeping
pirates culturally relevant.30 6
A General History of the Pyrates has largely exerted a more indirect
influence on modem depictions of pirates than Treasure Island.
Ironically, one of the works that borrows most heavily from Defoe's
account takes the form of a prequel series to Stevenson's Black Sails.3 0 7
The series features historical pirates described by Defoe as characters,3 08
depicts the pirates' attempts to create their own society under their own
code in New Providence,3 0 9 and ultimately portrays the end of the venture
at the hands of Woodes Rogers in A General History of the Pyrates.3 1 0
Defoe's influence, however, can also be seen in pirate films with fewer
direct connections. For instance, both Captain Blood and the Pirates of
the Caribbean movie series feature pirates who have created their own
societies with their own codes.31 1 Interestingly, both Captain Blood and
the Pirates of the Caribbean series rather strengthen the theme of liberty
303 TREASURE ISLAND (Walt Disney Productions 1950).
' TREASURE PLANET (Walt Disney Pictures 2002); MUPPET TREASURE ISLAND (Walt
Disney Pictures 1996).
30s TREASURE ISLAND (1950), supra note 303; Gretchen McCulloch, Why do Pirates
Talk Like That?, SLATE (Sep. 19, 2014, 11:32 AM), https://slate.com/human-
interest/2014/09/pirate-speech-origins-in-west-country-english-via-robert-newton-aka-long-
john-silver.html.
3 Id.
307 Compare DEFOE, supra note 247, with Black Sails (Starz 2014-2017).
300 Black Sails (2014-2017), supra note 307; DEFOE, supra note 247.
' Black Sails (2014-2017), supra note 307; DEFOE, supra note 247.
310 See DEFOE, supra note 247, at 50-53.
311 PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: AT WORLD'S END (Walt Disney Pictures 2007);
PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: THE CURSE OF THE BLACK PEARL (Walt Disney Pictures 2003);
CAPTAIN BLOOD (Warner Bros. Pictures 1935).
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from the earlier works. Captain Blood's title character ises to piracy from
political slavery, and in almost an echo of the Whig treatment of Robin
Hood, sees his fortunes turn with the restoration of good government via
the Glorious Revolution.3 1 2 In Pirates of the Caribbean: Curse of the
Black Pearl, pirate Captain Jack Sparrow describes his ship as
"freedom." 3 13 Similarly, the second and third films in the series portray
the various pirate characters as plotting to prevent a world devoid of
autonomy at the hands of the tyrannical institution of the East India
Trading Company.3 1 4 The Pirates of the Caribbean movies also express
themes of equality and social justice, as seen through the pirate crews of
mixed genders and races as well as through the Governor's daughter,
Elizabeth Swan, choosing a blacksmith's apprentice over a Post Captain
in His Majesty's Navy for a romantic partner.'
The influence of A General History of the Pyrates extends to video
game depictions of pirates. Pirates began featuring as a subject of video
games fairly early in the development of the new medium with Sid
Meier's Pirates!3 16 The game features elements found in Defoe's work,
such as division of plunder into equal shares and the potential removal of
captains by their crews.3 1 7 A 2004 remake of the game includes these
features as well as many of the captains whose exploits Defoe chronicled
as legendary pirates the player can vanquish.1 Significantly, the player's
character in the remake is forced into a life of adventure on the high seas
by the evil actions of a corrupt nobleman, whom the player must pursue
to rescue various imprisoned family members of the player's character.3 1 9
Thus, in addition to the elements of the pirate view of equality taken from
Defoe, the game features the theme of pirate liberty in the face of social
and political oppression.
The theme of pirates setting themselves at liberty outside the
oppression of ordered society also reverberates throughout the video game
312 CAPTAIN BLOOD (1935), supra note 311.
313 PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: THE CURSE OF THE BLACK PEARL (2003), supra note
311.
314 PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: AT WORLD'S END (2007), supra note 311; PIRATES OF
THE CARIBBEAN: DEAD MAN'S CHEST (Wait Disney Pictures 2006).
315 PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: AT WORLD'S END (2007), supra note 311; PIRATES OF
THE CARIBBEAN: DEAD MAN'S CHEST (2006), supra note 314; PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN:
THE CURSE OF THE BLACK PEARL (2003), supra note 311
316 SID MEIER'SPIRATES! (MicroProse 1987).
317 Id.
318 SID MEIER'S PIRATES!: LIVE THE LIFE (Firaxis Games 2004).
319 Id.
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that follows A General History of the Pyrates most closely-Assassin's
Creed IV: Black Flag.32 0 Set in the backdrop of the pirate settlement of
Providence described by Defoe, the game features many of Defoe's
pirates as major characters and sees them complete expeditions taken
directly from the pages ofA General History of the Pyrates, such as when
Blackbeard raids the Carolinas in search of medicine.3 21 As such, the
themes of antiauthoritarianism, liberty, equality, and social justice from
Defoe's treatment of the pirates, also run through Black Flag. The game
drastically expands the themes by presenting Providence not just as a
pirate society, but as a pirate republic; portraying the protagonist, Edward
Kenway, as combating corrupt institutions such as the slave trade; and
featuring egalitarian interactions among pirates of mixed races, genders,
and classes.3 22 In fact, this strengthening of the recurring themes aligns
the game with the overarching themes of the broader series, which depicts
a heroic, yet antiauthoritarian, "brotherhood" of assassins waging secret
war in the name of human freedom and equality against the sinister and
tyrannical templar order.32 3 Given this theme, basing a game on Defoe's
depiction of pirates makes a lot of sense.
Frontiersmen and gunslingers as different kinds of outlaws also
appear frequently in modem narratives in various media. Examples of the
former include film adaptations of James Fenimore Cooper's classic tales
as well as television series featuring historical figures acting in the role.32 4
320 ASSASSIN'S CREED IV: BLACK FLAG (Ubisoft Annecy Production Studio 2013).
321 ASSASSIN'S CREED IV: BLACK FLAG (2013), supra note 320; DEFOE, supra note 247.
322 ASSASsIN'S CREED IV: BLACK FLAG (2013), supra note 320.
323 See ASSASSIN'S CREED (Ubisoft Montreal 2007); see also ASSASSIN'S CREED II
(Ubisoft Montreal 2009); ASSASSIN'S CREED: BROTHERHOOD (Ubisoft Annecy Production
Studio 2010); ASSASSIN'S CREED: REVELATIONS (Ubisoft Annecy Production Studio 2011);
ASSASSIN'S CREED: SYNDICATE (Ubisoft Quebec 2015).
324 See, e.g., THE LAST OF THE MOHICANS (United Artists 1936). The plot summary is
as follows: "As Alice and Cora Munro attempt to find their father, a British officer in the French
and Indian War, they are set upon by French soldiers and their cohorts, Huron tribesmen led by
the evil Magua. Fighting to rescue the women are Chingachgook and his sons Uncas, the last
ofthe Mohican tribe, and their white ally, the frontiersman Natty Bumppo, known as Hawkeye."
See The Last of the Mohicans (1936), IMDB, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0027869/ (last
visited Mar. 20, 2020). See THE LAST OF THE MOHICANS (20th Century Fox 1992). The plot
summary is as follows: "Three trappers protect the daughters of a British Colonel in the midst
of the French and Indian War." See The Last of the Mohicans (1992), IMDB,
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0104691/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). See Davy Crockett
(Disney-ABC Domestic Television 1954-1955). The plot summary is as follows: "Legends
from the life of famed American frontiersman Crockett and his friend George Russell fight in
the Creek Indian War. Then Crockett is elected to Congress and brings his rough-hewn ways to
the House of Representatives. Finally, Crockett and Russell journey to Texas and partake in the
last stand at the Alamo." See Dav Crockett (1954-1955), JOHN WAYNE MESSAGE BOARD
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Of these, the 1992 film adaptation of The Last of the Mohicans bears
special mention, as it strikes a decidedly more expressly antiauthoritarian
tone than its source material.32 5 In the film, Hawkeye, rather than reject
society by absenting himself from it, verbally rejects British authority and
aids his fellow Americans, some of whom speak with proto-revolutionary
sentiments, in deserting.32 6 The film also drives home the social justice
theme of the plot by portraying the villain, Magua, as having been twisted
by the cruel oppression of European colonizers.32 7
Examining in detail every gunslinger who has appeared on screen in
a Western would be well beyond the scope of this work; however, a few
examples will suffice to show that this trope also persists in our culture.
First, let us highlight a film expressly about an outlaw-The Outlaw Josey
Wales.3 2 8 Similar to Joaquin Murieta, Josey Wales turns to outlawry to
avenge himself of injustices committed against his family by institutional
powers, in his case unscrupulous union soldiers.3 29 Familiar themes of
liberty, equality, and social justice recur as Josey removes himself to the
Texas frontier, forms a lasting partnership with Cherokee Lone Watie, and
eventually makes peace with his demons as well as with the neighboring
Commanche.3 3 0 Second, Joaquin Murieta himself appears onscreen in The
Mask ofZorro, in an apparent nod to the influences of Ridge's portrayal
on the earlier Disney television series, Zorro.33 1 Both portrayals of Zorro
(JWMB), https://dukewayne.com/index.php?thread/6803-davy-crockett-1954-1955-tv/ (last
visited Mar. 20, 2020). See Daniel Boone (20th Century Fox Television 1964-1970). The plot
summary is as follows: "Frontier hero Daniel Boone conducts surveys and expeditions around
Boonesborough, running into both friendly and hostile Indians, just before and during the
Revolutionary War." See Daniel Boone, IMDB, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0057742/ (last
visited Mar. 20, 2020).
325 THE LAST OF THE LAST OF THE MOHICANS (1992), supra note 324.
326 Id.
327 Id
328 THE OUTLAW JOSEY WALES (Warner Bros. 1976); see The Outlaw Josey Wales
(1976), [MDB, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0075029/?ref_-ttmi tt (last visited Mar. 20,2020)
("Missouri farmer Josey Wales joins a Confederate guerrilla unit and winds up on the run from
the Union soldiers who murdered his family.").
329 Id
330 Id.
331 THE MASK OF ZORRO (TriStar Pictures 1998); see The Mask of Zorro, IMDB,
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0120746/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2020) ("A young thief, seeking
revenge for the death of his brother, is trained by the once great, but aged Zorro, who also
pursues vengeance ofhis own."); see StephenAndes, Zorro's Origins and The Head ofJoaquin
Murrieta, MEDrUM (Dec. 12, 2018), https://medium.com/@steveandes/zorros-origins-and-the-
head-of-joaquin-murrieta-decdf28edf48; see Zorro (Disney-ABC Domestic Television 1957-
1959); see Zorro, IMDB, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0050079/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2020)
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lean heavily on the trope of the outlaw as an antiauthoritarian defender of
liberty, equality, and social justice.3 32 Unforgiven depicts an aging outlaw
come out of retirement to avenge and to protect a group of sex workers,
left vulnerable by a corrupt sheriff to the depredations of employees of the
local industrial power.33 3 While significantly darker in tone than most
similar films, Unforgiven nonetheless messages approval of
antiauthoritarian actions to thwart tyrannical abuses of power and protect
society's most vulnerable.3 34 Thus, the nineteenth-century tradition of the
western gunslinger continues in our culture.
In addition to full narratives, twentieth and twenty-first century
media include the use of outlaw and pirate terminology and imagery in
other fields, such as popular music and advertising.3 3 5 For instance,
members of a subfield of country music opposed to the rigid structures
and corporate values of the Nashville country music industry came to call
their movement and music style "Outlaw Country."3 36 Other examples
come from punk music, which is perhaps the most antiauthoritarian form
of music in which pirate imagery abounds in the names of bands (e.g.,
Black Flag)3 37 albums (e.g., Rum Sodomy & The Lash),3 3 8 and songs
(e.g., Friggin' in The Riggin'),3 3 9 with one song, Queen Anne's Revenge,
even referencing Blackbeard's ship from A General History of the
Pyrates.3 4 0 Hip-Hop, another musical genre with antiauthoritarian
overtones, also frequently features songs that invoke the Robin Hood-
esque language of robbing from the rich to give to the poor.
34 1 In the
("Don Diego de la Vega opposes the corrupt tyrants of Spanish California as the masked
swordsman, Zorro.").
332 THE MASK OF ZORRO (1998), supra note 331; Zorro (Disney-ABC Domestic
Television 1957-1959), supra note 331.
'3 UNFORGIVEN (Warner Bros. Pictures 1992); see Unforgiven, IMDB,
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0105695/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2020) ("Retired Old West
gunslinger William Munny reluctantly takes on one last job, with the help of his old partner
Ned Logan and a young man, The "Schofield Kid.").
334 Id.
31s See, e.g., ICE CUBE, TOMORROW (EMI 2008); Captain Morgan TV Commercials,
ISPOT.t, https://www.ispot.tv/brands/dNz/captain-morgan (last visited Mar. 14. 2019).
336 See JASON MELLARD, PROGRESSIVE COUNTRY: HOW THE 1970s TRANSFORMED THE
TEXAN IN POPULAR CULTURE 117-24 (2013).
337 See BLACK FLAG, https://www.blackflagband.com/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2019).
338 See THE POGUES, RUM SODOMY & THE LASH (MCA Records 1985).
33 See SEX PISTOLS, FRIGGIN' IN THE RIGGIN' (Virgin Records 1979).
340 FLOGGING MOLLY, QUEEN ANNE'S REVENGE (SideOneDummy 2004); DEFOE,
supra note 247.
341 See, e.g., ICE CUBE, TOMORROW (EMI 2008); FREEWAY & JAKE ONE, THROW YOUR
HANDS UP (Rhymesayers Entertainment 2010); PUBLIC ENEMY, WATCH THE DOOR (Guerilla
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advertising world, the famous tobacco advertising campaign featuring the
"Marlboro Man" evokes the freedom of the frontier combined with
images of cowboy attire associated with westerns and gunslingers.3 4 2
Similarly, a promotional campaign for Captain Morgan rum features
either a pirate captain engaging in various acts of exaggerated
independence, free of inhibitions, or regular people behaving similarly
before striking a pirate pose.3 43 Allusions such as these work because the
narratives connected to the images and phrasings used by songs and ads
carry with them the cultural connotations of liberty, equality, and social
justice established by those narratives.
In summary, the tropes of the outlaw and the pirate have featured
prominently in English and then American culture from the late middle
ages onwards in various forms. Furthermore, each trope glorifies and even
celebrates antiauthoritarianism taken in the promotion of liberty, equality,
or social justice. As our culture has shifted, those themes have increased
in strength and expression. Additionally, as the advertising examples
demonstrate, anyone who has grown up in our culture will have
internalized the connection between the symbols of outlaws and pirates
and their association with idealized antiauthoritarianism concepts. Thus,
Americans may be culturally conditioned to reject authority when that
authority conflicts with our ideal norms of liberty, equality, and social
justice-or at least conditioned to be able to tap into that cultural current
under certain circumstances. Let us now look to see how this plays out
with American judges by turning our gaze to judicially activist cases.
V. ANTI-AUTHORITARIAN JUDGES: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AS A
REFLECTION OF IDEAL NORMS OF LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND
SOCIAL JUSTICE
Before beginning our analysis of the cases, it may be helpful to
remind the reader of the definition of judicial activism incorporating a
cultural component suggested above in Part m, namely that judicial
activism is an antiauthoritarian rejection of the ordinarily accepted
constraints on judicial decision-making when those constraints conflict
Funk Recordings 2006); GETO Boys, DAMN IT FEELS GOOD TO BE A GANGSTA (Rap-a-Lot
1992).
342 See Marlboro Commercials, YouTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?vrm7pProAG fA (last visited Mar. 14, 2019).
343 See Captain Morgan TV Commercials, supra note 335.
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with deeply held cultural values of liberty, equality, and social justice.'
In examining how specific cases align with the suggested definition, this
Article will look at examples from four groups of cases. First, we will look
at a selection of cases from eras of the Supreme Court commonly
identified as activist: the Marshall Court, the Lochner Era, the Warren
Court, and the Rehnquist Court.3 4 5 Second, we will look at cases
exhibiting activism from the most recently completed Supreme Court
term, the 2017-2018 term. It is important to do so because if judicial
activism is indeed a manifestation of cultural values, then one would
expect it to be rather more commonplace than a handful of historically
significant cases. Similarly, one would expect to find it beyond just the
Supreme Court of the United States. Accordingly, the third group of cases
to be examined will feature examples of activism from state courts as well
as lower federal courts. Finally, we will look at examples of problem cases
that act in ways counter to the ideal norms described above, either through
extreme judicial action or through extreme judicial restraint. In examining
each of these groups of cases, a two-pronged methodology will be used.
First, we will examine in what sense each holding is an act of
antiauthoritarianism. Following this, we will look at the language used in
each case's rationale that suggests the application of ideal norms of
liberty, equality, or social justice. Having established our framework, let
us now turn to examining specific activist cases.
A. The Usual Suspects: Sample Cases from Courts Commonly
Identified as Activist
As described in Part II above, scholars generally recognize that
judicial activism has been a fairly constant phenomenon in American law,
with particular emphasis being placed on the Marshall Court, the Lochner
Era, the Warren Court, and the Rehnquist Court.346 As such, let us now
look at a sample case from each era embodying the spirit of activism of
the judicial era in which it was decided.
As with many issues in American constitutional law, an examination
of judicial activism should begin at the logical starting point of Marbury
3" See supra Part III.
345 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137
(1803).
34 See supra Part II.
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v. Madison.3 4 7 Marbury's antiauthoritarian act was invalidating the
portion of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, which conferred upon the
Supreme Court the ability to issue writs of mandamus as a court of original
jurisdiction.3 4 The Court rejected the authority of the statute, which
ordinarily courts would be expected to apply and to interpret.34 9 The
Court's rationale for this antiauthoritarian act derives directly from a
desire to safeguard liberty.35 0 As Chief Justice Marshall asks:
To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation
committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those
intended to be restrained? The distinction, between a government with limited
and unlimited powers, is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on
whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed, are of equal
obligation.35 1
Marshall goes on to note that if Congress can change the Constitution
by ordinary acts, "then written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the
part of the people, to limit a power, in its own nature illimitable."3 5 2 Thus,
the Court stressed the roles the limitations of government found in the
Constitution play in safeguarding liberty by rejecting an authority that
exceeds those limits. 3 5 3 Such a rationale is reminiscent of the later
depictions of Robin Hood as a force of liberty resisting sinister
government institutions and aligns well with an ideal norm of liberty.
During the Lochner Era, the Court invoked concepts of liberty when
striking down statutory authorities. As an example, let us look at the case
that gives the era its name: Lochner v. New York.3 5 4 The antiauthoritarian
act in Lochner involved invalidating a state labor law that prevented
bakery employees from working more than ten hours per day, six days per
week.3 5 5 Again, the Court strikes down an authority we would normally
expect courts to apply and interpret, reaching across the divide of
34 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
348 Id. at 138, 180.
349 Id. at 180.
35o Id. at 174.
351 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176-77.
352 Id at 177.
353 Id. at 177-78.
354 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
355 Id. at 64.
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federalism to do so.3 56 The Court expressly couches its action in terms of
freedom, noting that the "employee may desire to earn the extra money,
which would arise from his working more than the proscribed time, but
this statute forbids the employer from permitting the employee to earn
it." 35 7 The Court continues:
The statute necessarily interferes with the right of contract between the
employer and employees, concerning the number of hours in which the latter
may labor in the bakery of the employer. The general right to make a contract in
relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.358
Thus, the Court directly invokes the ideal norm of liberty. Lochner,
however, is a somewhat complicated case because it pits ideal norms
against each other. As Justice Harlan's dissent makes clear:
It is plain that this statute was enacted in order to protect the physical well-
being of those who work in bakery and confectionery establishments. It may be
that the statute had its origin, in part, in the belief that employers and employees
in such establishments were not upon an equal footing, and that the necessities
of the latter often compelled them to submit to such exactions as unduly taxed
their strength. Be this as it may, the statute mustbe taken as expressing the belief
of the people of New York that, as a general rule, and in the case of the average
man, labor in excess of sixty hours during a week in such establishments may
endanger the health of those who thus labor.
359
Thus, in Lochner, tension exists between the ideal norm of liberty on
the one hand and the norms of equality and social justice on the other.
Interestingly, the majority opinion itself notes this tension, indicating it
needs to make a difficult choice in adjudicating the balance between
general welfare and individual right.3 6 0 To our modern sensibilities, the
Court in Lochner may have made the wrong decision in how to establish
the balance, which in part accounts for the reputation the case has;
however, in rejecting the authority of the state statute, the Court did
invoke the ideal norm of liberty.
356 See id. ("[T]he freedom of master and employee to contract with each other in relation
to their employment, and in defining the same, cannot be prohibited or interfered with, without
violating the Federal Constitution.").
. Id. at 52-53.
. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.
39 Id. at 69 (Harlan, White, and Day, JJ., dissenting).
" See id. at 54 (majority opinion).
2020] 313
QUINNIPIAC LAWREVIEW
As the Lochner Era Court placed more emphasis on liberty when it
came into tension with equality and social justice, the Warren Court is
famous for having tacked in the opposite direction. For example, Brown
v. Board of Education serves as a good example of the activism of the
Warren Court.3 6 1 In Brown, the Court broadly invalidated a swath of state
and local legislation providing for segregated public schools, expressly
rejecting its own precedent and the "separate but equal doctrine"
established in Plessy v. Ferguson.3 6 2 Thus, Brown's antiauthoritarianism
includes hostility against statutory authorities from across the federalism
divide, as in Lochner, but also a repudiation of precedential authority we
would have expected to control the issue. The Court expressly evoked the
ideal norm of equality in reaching its decision, noting that "separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal."3 6 3 Furthermore, on its way
to the ultimate holding, the Court also discussed public education in terms
consonant with the ideal norm of social justice:
[Education] is required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of
good citizenship. Today it is a principle instrument in awaking the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping
him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education.364
Therefore, the failure to provide quality education to certain populations
would unjustly render them unequal in society throughout their lives. The
Court further made explicit how segregated education inherently fails to
provide children of color with equal opportunity: "To separate them from
others of similar age and qualification solely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."365
Brown thus demonstrates how the Warren Court felt comfortable striking
down wide swaths of the legal landscape in order to advance ideal norms
of equality and social justice.
As discussed in Part II above, scholars often point to the Rehnquist
Court as an example of conservative judicial activism to show that judicial
361 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
362 Id. at 495 (overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
363 Id
3 Id. at 493.
36s Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
314 [Vol. 38:259
OUTLAWS, PIRATES, JUDGES
activism is not limited to progressive judges, such as those who sat on the
Warren Court. The Rehnquist Court's conservative activism generally
takes the form of reinforcing the concept of federalism. Let us look at
United States v. Lopez as an example.3 6 6 In Lopez, the Court rejected
statutory authority and invalidated a federal act that criminalized the
carrying of firearms into schools.3 6 7 In providing the rationale for its
invalidation, the Court used language evocative of that used by Justice
Marshall writing for the majority in Marbury, stressing the importance of
the division of government powers, not just in terms of separation of
powers, but also in terms of federalism, in safeguarding liberty from
governmental abuse: "[t]his constitutionally mandated division of
authority 'was adopted by the Framers to ensure protection of our
fundamental liberties' . ... '[A] healthy balance of power between the
States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and
abuse from either front."'3 6 8 Establishing the importance of federalism to
upholding liberty, the Court then turned to examining the statute and
found that Congress lacked the authority to legislate the use of guns in
schools, noting that:
The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity
that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of
interstate commerce. Respondent was a local student at a local school; there is
no indication that he had recently moved in interstate commerce, and there is no
requirement that his possession of the firearm have any concrete tie to interstate
commerce.369
The Court equated upholding the particular law with shifting the
nature of Congress's commerce power from enumerated to general, a
move which the Court casted as a threat to liberty.37 0 Reinforcing this
portrayal were the Court's multiple references to the defendant as a high
school student or as a "local student," implying that a kid who made a
simple mistake would be dogged by a federal felony the rest of his life
because of a tyrannical overreach by Congress.3 7 1 Thus, similar to the
Marshall Court, the Rehnquist Court interpreted its duty as reinforcing
constitutional structures to safeguard the ideal norm of liberty.
3 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
367 See id. at 551 (discussing the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990).
368 Id. at 552 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
369 Id. at 567.
370 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
3n Id.
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Through these examples, one sees that the Supreme Court throughout
history has employed rhetoric connected to ideal norms of liberty,
equality, or social justice in justifying actions taken against authorities it
would normally follow. If judicial activism, however, truly is an
expression of higher cultural ideals, then we would expect it to occur
rather frequently. Those ideals would in theory be a constant influence
upon judges. As such, let us now turn our attention to the 2017-2018
Supreme Court term.
B. The 2017-2018 Supreme Court Term's Active Rejection of
Authorities
When looking at the 2017-2018 Supreme Court term as a whole,
several cases stand out for their rejection of legal authorities. For example,
let us look at Carpenter v. United States.3 72 In Carpenter, the Court took
issue with a federal statute allowing authorities to obtain data from cell
phone providers via a court order based on "reasonable grounds" instead
of the "probable cause" standard of a traditional warrant.3 73 Furthermore,
the Court departed from the "third-party doctrine" established by
precedent.37 4 Although the majority's holding was narrow in that it
declined to extend precedent, Justice Kennedy's dissent makes clear the
drastic nature of the dseparture of precedent: "This case involves new
technology, but the Court's stark departure from relevant Fourth
Amendment precedents and principles is, in my submission, unnecessary
and incorrect, requiring this respectful dissent."3 75 The Court justifies its
restriction of statutory authority and its departure from precedent by
invoking the vital part the Fourth Amendment plays in protecting liberty
from governmental abuse, indicating that the Amendment's role "is to
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary
invasions by government officials."3 7 6 The Court then described the aims
of the Framers in drafting the Fourth Amendment as being "to place
obstacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance."3 7 7
372 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
SId. at 2221.
374 Id. at 2220 (declining to extend United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) and
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)).
3 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223 (Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, J.J., dissenting).
376 Id. at 2213 (majority opinion) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court of City and
County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)).
377 Id. at2214 (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)).
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Additionally, the Court portrayed cell phones and the data they collect as
enabling such a police state, asserting that "cell phone location
information is detailed, encyclopedic and effortlessly compiled."3 7 8
Furthermore, the Court argued that cell phones are integral to modem life,
stating that they are "indispensable to participation in modem society[,]"
to an extent that the choice to not have your location tracked, i.e., to not
use a cell phone, is not actually a valid choice.37 9 Thus, in Carpenter, the
Court rejected the applicability of precedent (the third-party doctrine
established by Smith and Miller) and departed from the language of
statutory authority in establishing a constitutional requirement that police
obtain a warrant based on probable cause in order to retrieve cell phone
location information from cellular providers.380 The Court arguably did so
because of concerns about threats posed by technology to the ideal norm
of liberty.
Janus v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal
Employees, Council 31 featured a similar, but stronger rejection of
precedential authority.38 ' In Janus, the Court expressly overruled
precedent that allowed public labor unions to charge non-members fees in
connection with union efforts that benefitted those non-members.3 82 and
This action thus invalidated a wide swath of state laws across the country.
To justify its rejection of both precedential and state statutory authority,
much like in Lochner, the Court used language pertaining to employees'
individual rights and liberties, asserting that "[d]esignating a union as the
employees' exclusive representative substantially restricts the rights of
individual employees."38 3 Specifically, the Court found that the statute in
question impinged upon employees' First Amendment rights of free
speech, stating: "[c]ompelling individuals to mouth support for views they
find objectionable violates that cardinal constitutional command, and in
most contexts, any such effort would be universally condemned."3 8 4 The
Court then extended the concept of compelled speech to also cover
compelled subsidization of speech, stating that "[b]ecause the compelled
subsidization of private speech seriously impinges on First Amendment
378 Id. at 2216.
37 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
380 Id. at 2221.
381 Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cty., and Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448
(2018).
382 See id. at 2459-60 (overruling Aboodv. Detroit Bd. ofEd., 431 U.S. 209 (1977)).
383 Id. at 2460.
3 Id. at 2463.
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rights, it cannot casually be allowed."3 85 Thus, the Court in Janus
overturned precedent and invalidated state laws, thus allowing for
mandatory union fees, because the Court deemed it a necessary step to
protect the rights of individuals-a sentiment that aligns with an ideal
norm of liberty.
Similarly, Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association
invoked liberty as a rationale for the invalidation of a federal statute.386in
Murphy, the Court declared the Federal Professional and Amateur Sports
Protection Act unconstitutional under federalism and the anti-
commandeering doctrine.3 8 7 The rationale for invalidating the statutory
authority relied on federalism as part of the Framers' safeguards of
liberty. 38 8 The Court in Murphy explained how the system of dual
sovereigns limits both state and federal power and expressly declared that
the anti-commandeering doctrine's protection of federalism "serves as
'one of the Constitution's structural protections of liberty."'3 8 9 Because of
the potential threat to destabilize the institutional safeguards protecting
the ideal norm of liberty, the Court concluded that the statutory authority
must be struck down.3 90
Additionally, the 2017-2018 term featured a case in which the Court
struck down a federal statute because of the negative effect it exerted upon
the ideal of equality.3 9 1 In Sessions v. Dimaya, the Court struck down the
federal statutory definition of "crime of violence" as unconstitutionally
vague and disallowed the Immigration and Nationality Act's reference to
the definition.392 As we will see, the rationale for rejecting the statutory
authority stemmed from the Court's desire for equal protection of the
laws. The Court noted that "[b]ecause the clause had both an ordinary-
case requirement and an ill-defined risk threshold, it necessarily
'devolv[ed] into guesswork and intuition,' invited arbitrary enforcement,
and failed to provide fair notice."3 93 As such, the Court held that the statute
385 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464.
386 See Murphy v. Nat'1 Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
387 Id. at 1478.
38 Id. at 1477.
. Id. at 1477 (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997)).
" See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1484-85 ("[The Court's] job is to interpret the law Congress
has enacted and decide whether it is consistent with the Constitution. PASPA is not. PASPA
'regulate[s] state governments' regulation' of their citizens . . . . The Constitution gives
Congress no such power.").
"' See Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018).
392 Id. at 1216.
3 Id. at 1223 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2559 (2015)).
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in question "produces more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the
Due Process Clause tolerates."3 9 4 In his concurrence, Justice Gorsuch
stated that the connection between arbitrariness and unequal application
of the law more forcefully, noting that vague laws "can invite the exercise
of arbitrary power .. . by leaving the people in the dark about what the
law demands and allowing prosecutors and courts to make it up." 395 Thus,
concerns for equality and equal application of the laws undergird the
holding and rationale in Dimaya.
This brief look at examples from the most recently completed
Supreme Court term indicates that the Court does indeed regularly engage
in the antiauthoritarian judicial action of rejecting authorities.
Furthermore, it indicates that the Court does so when the authorities in
question conflict with ideal norms such as liberty or equality. Such
findings suggest that deeply held cultural values do influence judicial
behavior. If, however, the judicial activism so examined does flow from
shared cultural values, then we should also see similar acts of
antiauthoritarianism with similar rationales in courts beyond just the
Supreme Court of the United States. As such, let us now explore examples
of recent judicial activism from state courts and lower federal courts.
C. Judicial Activism Beyond the Supreme Court of the United
States
While a comprehensive survey of state cases from across the country
would defy all concepts of feasibility, a pair of examples from the past
year will demonstrate that state courts do indeed reject authorities that
clash with ideal norms of liberty, equality, and social justice. For instance,
in Bevin v. Commonwealth ex rel. Beshear,396 the Kentucky Supreme
Court declared a state statute unconstitutional on procedural grounds, and
thus void.3 9 7 The government's argument that the case raised a non-
justiciable political question was unconvincing.3 9 8 The court took drastic
action against the statutory authority out of a concern for institutional
constraints on government in the furtherance of liberty. Specifically, the
Kentucky Constitution requires bills to be read in each house three times
394 I. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2251, 2558 (2015)).
3 Sessions, 138 S. Ct. at 1223-24 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
396 See Bevin v. Commonwealth ex rel. Beshear, 563 S.W.3d 74 (Ky. 2018).
397 Id. at 78.
398 Id.
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before they may be passed as laws.3 99 In Bevin, the Kentucky Supreme
Court described the peculiar process by which the state legislature
attempted to comply with the constitutional provision-at the end of the
legislative term, and lacking the time for the required three readings for
passing a pension reform bill demanded by the governor, the legislature
replaced an eleven page bill authorizing new wastewater facilities with a
291 page pension bill via amendment.4 0 0 Furthermore, the court pointed
out that of the six required readings, five of the readings were of the bill
in its wastewater iteration.40 1 The court expressed disapproval of such
legislative schemas: "The Court's power, indeed, its duty, to declare the
meaning of constitutional provisions is a primary function of the judicial
branch in the scheme of checks and balances that has protected freedom
and liberty in this country and in this Commonwealth for more than two
centuries."40 2
The court concluded that compliance with these institutional
safeguards "cannot be achieved by reading a bill only by its title which
has no rational relationship to the subject of the law being enacted."4 03
Thus, the Kentucky Supreme Court acted in furtherance of the ideal norm
of liberty in striking down statutory authority.
An example of a state court rejecting legislative authority in
furtherance of the ideal norm of equality can be seen in League of Women
Voters ofPennsylvania v. Commonwealth." In League of Women Voters,
the court acted against two separate authorities. First, it invalidated the
statute that provided Pennsylvania's 2011 congressional redistricting.4 05
In reaching its result, the court also rejected precedential authority.40 6 The
court's rationale for its actions took the form of asserting that the partisan
gerrymandering featured in the redistricting act "deprives [p]etitioners of
their state constitutional right to free and equal elections."4 07 Additionally,
the court emphasized the central role that equal rights play in
Pennsylvania's values: "[t]he people of this Commonwealth should never
lose sight of the fact that, in its protection of essential rights, our founding
' KY. CONST. § 46.
4" See Bevin, 563 S.W.3d at 79.
401 See id. at 80.
402 Id. at 83.
403 Id. at 93.
40 See League of Women Voters of Pa v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737 (Pa. 2018).
405 Id. at 825.
406 Id at 813 (abrogating Erfer v. Commonwealth, 794 A.2d 325 (Pa. 2002)).
407 Idat818.
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document is the ancestor, not the offspring, of the Federal
Constitution."4 0 8 Such language strongly suggests that equality is
certainly recognized as an ideal norm in Pennsylvania.
Federal trial and intermediate appellate courts also engage in the
rejection of legal authorities that run afoul of ideal norms such as equality
and social justice. Such actions can be clearly seen in the spate of lower
courts enjoining the enforcement of state restrictions prohibiting same-sex
marriage, as a good number of these decisions occurred before the
Supreme Court took the same action in Obergefell v. Hodges.40 9 Let us
look specifically at Bourke v. Beshear as an example.4 1 0 In Bourke, a
federal district court held a provision of the Kentucky Constitution, along
with four statutory provisions that restricted recognition of marriage to
opposite-sex couples, as unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 1 1 The court based its rationale for
its invalidation of state statutory and constitutional authority on concepts
of equality and social justice, recognizing that "[n]o one disputes that the
same-sex couples who have brought this case are treated differently under
Kentucky law than those in comparable opposite-sex marriages."4 1 2 This
also poses a problem for the court since it provided a non-exhaustive list
of examples of individual rights based on both federal and state law,
dependent upon having one's marriage recognized by the government.4 13
Thus, the court asserted that Kentucky's laws' "purpose and principal
effect [is] to treat two groups differently."4 14 Such disparate treatment
"demeans one group by depriving them of rights provided for others."415
Such language invokes ideal norms of equality and social justice, ideals
which support the court's invalidation of statutory and constitutional
authority.
The above examples demonstrate that courts other than the Supreme
Court often reject authorities that we would normally expect them to
follow, and that they do so for similar rationales as those employed by the
" League of Women Voters, 178 A.3d at 741.
'9 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015); see, e.g., Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th
Cir. 2012); Marry Bishop v. United States ex. rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Okla.
2014); Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968 (S.D. Ohio 2013); Kitchen v. Herbert, 961
F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013).
410 See Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542 (W.D.Ky. 2014).
411 Id at 544.
412 Id. at 547.
413 Id. at 546-47.
414 See Bourke, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 550.
415 Id. at 551.
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Supreme Court. This supports the notion that deeply held cultural norms
of liberty, equality, and social justice do inform the behaviors of judges
and lead them to occasional acts of judicial antiauthoritarianism. The
existence of these ideal norms may also help us to explain why certain
episodes of the exertion of judicial power, or the lack thereof, trouble our
consciences. Let us now turn to the problem cases.
D. The Problem Cases: Unjustified Activism and Unjustified
Restraint
On occasion, the Supreme Court flexes judicial muscle in a way that
may be viewed as antiauthoritarian, but which does not align with ideal
norms of liberty, equality, or social justice. On other occasions, the
Supreme Court demurs from exercising its authority to invalidate
authorities that clearly conflict with those same ideal norms. Both types
of cases are generally met with the general repugnance of history. A prime
example of an unjustified activist case is Dred Scott v. Sanford.4 16 The
authority expressly attacked in Dred Scott was the Act of Congress that
created the Missouri Compromise, prohibiting slavery in federal
territories north of a certain line.'17 Although the Court's rationale does
invoke some language of property rights, the main basis of its argument
was the indelible protections of slavery found in the Constitution,
equating racial slavery to a cherished value of the framers.'1 8 Inreaching
this decision, the Court also held "people of the United States" to mean
"citizens" and precluded the possibility that descendants of African slaves
could ever amount to citizens or people.'1 9 Thus, the motivation of the
Court in Dred Scott ran counter to norms of liberty and equality. While it
is true that the Framers included slavery in the Constitution, they were
aware of its tension with their stated ideals, as can be seen through their
use of euphemisms such as "all other [p]ersons" or "such Persons as any
of the States now existing shall think proper to admit."4 2 0 Additionally, in
his first draft of the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson, being
the recidivist that he was, included the African slave trade and slavery of
men as an evil perpetrated by King George before the Continental
Congress edited it out.42 1 Thus, our laws, which amount to minimal norms
416 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
417 Id. at 452.
418 Id. at 45 1-5 2.
419 Id. at 404-07.
420 See U.S. CONST. art. 1 §2 cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art 1. §9 cl. 1.
421 ALLEN, supra note 268, at 153-55.
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in Donovan's model, have always fallen short of the ideal norms they are
meant to further. Indeed, this very discrepancy is why some acts of
judicial antiauthoritarianism receive celebration as advancing the laws
closer to our ideals; yet Dred Scott receives the scorn it deserves for
moving our laws even further from our ideals.
Cases in which the Court fails to act to move our laws closer to our
ideals suffer similar consignment o the dustbins of history. As an example
of this sort of case, let us look at Korematsu v. United States.4 22 In
Korematsu, the Court upheld executive orders issued under the auspices
of a Congressional Act that removed Japanese Americans from their
homes and put them in internment camps.42 3 The Court's rationale took a
decidedly authoritarian tone, justifying the action based on credible
threats to national security posed by potential espionage.4 2 4 Under the
facts of the case, ideal norms of liberty, equality, and social justice all
suggest hat the Court should have taken an antiauthoritarian tack instead
of an authoritarian one. Indeed, Justice Murphy's dissent, mincing no
words, stated:
This exclusion of 'all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-
alien,' from the Pacific Coast area on a plea of military necessity in the absence
of martial law ought not to be approved. Such exclusion goes over 'the very
brink of constitutional power' and falls into the ugly abyss of racism.
4 2 5
The unjustified restraint exercised by the Court in Korematsu gives that
case nearly as bad a reputation as Dred Scott.
Thus, when courts engage in antiauthoritarian activism without being
guided by ideal norms such as liberty, equality, or social justice, their acts
are recognized as deeply flawed. Similarly, when courts exercise
authoritarian restraint when those same ideal norms suggest action, their
results are met with similar scorn.
The ideals of liberty, equality, and social justice described in Part IV
do exist as ideal norms that exert influence over American legal culture.
This is seen by the rationales promoting liberty and equality employed by
the cases most associated with judicial activisms; the existence of multiple
similar cases within the most recent Supreme Court term, as well as in
courts other than the Supreme Court; and the contempt with cases such as
422 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
423 Id. at 216-17.
424 Id. at 217.
425 Id. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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Dred Scott and Korematsu that do not conform with concepts of liberty
and equality.
VI. CONCLUSION
Applying a legal anthropological lens to the phenomenon of judicial
activism results in a better understanding of the phenomenon. Viewing
judicial activism as a legal expression of the sort of antiauthoritarianism
that our culture glorifies and promotes, as seen through the recurring
literary and popular cultural tropes of the outlaw and the pirate, allows for
an improved definition of judicial activism as well as for a better way of
evaluating individual cases, both activist and restrained, in terms of their
fit within our cultural values. Though culture can and will change over
time, the longevity of the outlaw and pirate tropes along with their long
association with themes of liberty, equality, and social justice, reveal the
existence of deeply held ideal norms aligning with those themes within
American culture. Furthermore, many of the associations between the
tropes and the themes have only increased over time. An examination of
"activist" caselaw reveals largely the same themes at play in those
instances when courts reject legal authorities that they would normally be
expected to follow. Because our society does value ideal norms of liberty,
equality, and social justice, judicial activism should be accepted as a net
positive if it advances those norms. Conversely, judicial restraint should
be ridiculed if it passes on an opportunity to strike down authority that
runs counter to the same. For these reasons, it makes sense to viewjudicial
activism as an antiauthoritarian rejection of the ordinarily accepted
constraints on judicial decision-making when those constraints conflict
with deeply held cultural values of liberty, equality, and social justice.
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